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Caste, Ethnicity and Exclusion in South Asia: The Role of 




The kind of social inequality and exclusion that exists in different South Asian societies, 
exhibits some common cultural and social structural characteristics, in some respects 
quite distinct from many other societies in the world. The distinctiveness is on account of 
the stratificatory system of caste that prevailed, in one form or the other, in these societies 
for centuries. Despite some basic differences in the political and religious organization of 
these societies, caste or caste-like institutional practices survive in them even today—in 
diluted or even transmuted form in some, while manifesting greater continuity in 
others—with their corresponding structures of social exclusion. 
 
I 
The Caste-ethnic Dimension of Exclusion 
Caste is the most intensively and widely studied South Asian institution and there 
is no need to reiterate the established wisdom here. I however wish to focus on, rather 
attempt to reformulate, some propositions on caste in terms that can facilitate a more 
direct and precise understanding of the contemporary structures of social exclusion in 
South Asia, the structures which indeed have emerged from the core of the caste system.   3 
 
 
First, from the perspective of social exclusion caste can be seen, more 
appropriately, as the institution that has been structuring and maintaining for centuries 
relations of power among different communities, and seeks to legitimise these power 
relations: (a) through systematically dispensing various mixes of economic and cultural 
assets/opportunities and deprivations to different communities and (b) through endowing 
religious/ideological sanctification of such dispensations. Second, the hierarchical 
structures based on a sacrilized system dispensing economic/cultural rewards and 
punishments, however, did not/could not permanently and fully incorporate or recast the 
cultural and historical identities of different communities in terms of hierarchical 
relations. In sum, if we were to grasp the special nature of exclusion in the South Asian 
societies, it is appropriate that caste is seen in terms of its historical-empirical character: 
i.e. sacralized power structure—rather than just a hierarchy of statuses—that has been 
reproducing itself in different contexts and times in the various South Asian societies.  
 
Caste: A Self-reproducing Power Structure 
Evolved over centuries, caste sustained communitarian identities of innumerable groups 
ethnically, culturally and socially distinct from each other and at the same time, held 
these communities together in a vast network of local hierarchies. Communities in 
different local hierarchies were arranged, normatively uniformly, in an ascriptively 
unequal macro-system of graded exclusion, which was politically, economically and 
epistemically dominated by a few, select communities through ages. The graded structure 
of exclusion was never a permanently fixed arrangement, and a fairly frequent upward 
and downward movement of communities took place within and across local hierarchies.   4 
 
 
However, a large divide always existed between communities in the small ruling sector 
(the dvijas or the twice born) which among themselves held virtual monopoly of different 
types of power (intellectual, political and economic) and a vast sector of the numerous 
other communities ascriptively expected to engage directly in production and service 
related activities (the sudras). A third and a relatively smaller sector of communities (of 
the excluded others: a  varna) developed over time at system’s periphery as a 
consequence of persistent enforcement of the principle of graded exclusion by the ruling 
communities. For these communities of the third sector, the system functioning on the 
principle of graded exclusion produced a situation of an all round, permanent exclusion. 
They were never formally recognized as a part of the system. As such, they were not 
assigned any specifically defined role or work in the system’s production and service 
domains nor in any other domain—thus depriving them of any means of 
livelihood.[Ambedkar] This systemic deprivation of livelihood accompanied by the 
social, cultural and moral exclusion of these communities forced them to live in a 
perpetual situation of economic and moral compulsion and ‘adopt’ means of livelihood 
involving work that was discarded as ‘unclean’ and degrading by the communities whom 
the system granted one or the other entitlement, ensuring them some kind of a right to 
work.[Ref] These communities of the third sector being ousted even from graded 
exclusion, remained permanently degraded, leaving them, unlike the other communities, 
little or no scope for upward mobility.[Srinivas] 
The intriguing question is how the caste character of exclusion—a hegemony of a 
few traditionally empowered communities based on graded exclusion, over the rest of the 
society—has survived in the South Asian societies in one form or the other, despite the   5 
 
 
fundamental ideological and structural changes that have occurred over a long period 
through the spread of religions like Islam and Christianity as well as of modern secular 
and egalitarian ideologies, all opposed to the very idea of hierarchy based on inherited 
statuses. Even more intriguing is the fact that such hegemony survived for so long with 
consent and collaboration of the subjugated communities. It is therefore not possible to 
problematize contemporary situations of inequality and exclusion in South Asian 
societies and evolve any agenda (policies and politics) for making these societies 
progressively inclusive, unless we take account of these long surviving, highly adaptive 
and hence resilient structures of exclusion.  
 
Two Faces of Caste 
Two commonly misconceived notions of caste held by policy-makers and often even by 
the analysts, come in the way of understanding its resilient and adaptive nature: first, that 
caste is a permanently fixed hierarchy of hereditary groups, second that a caste derives its 
identity almost exclusively from the status it has in the hierarchy. In fact caste has 
another face which is often shrouded in theory, i.e. of a community. It is important to 
elaborate and clarify here these two rather different existences of caste—the hierarchical 
and communitarian—in order that we understand why caste has remained the most 
resilient among the stratificatory structures. 
1. Caste as a hierarchy of statuses 
Seen in a historical perspective caste, or a caste-like structure, is a hierarchy of 
social forms within which concretely existing groups hold statuses, but from which they 
may move out and occupy other statuses. Thus the actual groups to which statuses are   6 
 
 
attached have always moved up and down in the hierarchies, in which process a group 
could detach itself from a given (born in) status and credibly adopt another higher status 
or may get pushed to a lower one. Thus when a group moves in the hierarchy, from one 
status to another, it inheres the power and privilege (or lack of it) of the status it enters. In 
this sense power and privileges are structurally tied to a status and not necessarily to a 
specific hereditary group. It is by resolutely sticking to certain statuses that historically a 
few groups traditionally representing epistemic, political/military and economic power 
have been able to dominate the entire system and maintain a degree of legitimacy of their 
power. This relationship between the group/community and status is although sustained 
by the ideology of hereditary virtues fixing permanent ritual distances among groups, 
historically there have been continuous countervailing movements to caste, which 
periodically resulted in several groups moving out of their born-in statuses and getting 
into new statuses. In the past the movements like Jainism, Buddhism, Tantricism and 
Bhakti caused such reshuffling of groups across statuses, in the ongoing hierarchal 
system. Yet, despite formidable ideological challenges and some structural impacts they 
made on it, by and large, traditionally dominating groups retained power in the system, 
usually by redefining, often relaxing the rules which maintained ritual distances and 
prevented choices. But it is only in the modern times that both ideological and structural 
challenges have converged, with implications for imploding the old hierarchical structure. 
These changes have, however, yet not appreciably reduced the power of the old status 
groups in the society. They have only made it unnecessary for the ruling status-groups to 
sustain and justify their claims to power in ritual or ascriptive terms; insofar as the   7 
 
 
intrinsic value of status survives in the society, the traditional status-groups can discard 
the old ideological terms and use new ones for validating their continuing status-power. 
2. Caste as a network of ethnic communities 
It is important to note that even in the traditional hierarchy-determined system of 
social hegemony the included and excluded communities did not exist in a bi-polar 
structure of power. The graded structure of exclusion also linked communities to each 
other in such a manner that caste could also be seen as a graded structure of inclusion in 
which power percolated to every community irrespective of its location in the hierarchy. 
This caused each community experience a sense of social salience in the system. Put in 
more concrete terms, despite being tied in a structure of hierarchy a community at each 
level, except probably at the bottom most level, enjoyed a degree of dominance over 
some others below it. The dominance was however maintained not just through exercise 
of power but also by a system of mutual obligation and dependence among the 
communities. While this system never pretended to establish one, culturally homogenized 
political community it did sustain a common symbolic meaning system making 
communications possible across types of communities (representing denominational, 
ethnic, linguistic, and occupational-cultural differences) and levels of hierarchy. No 
community had a cultural identity autonomous of the other, it was always expressed in 
relational terms, where a particular identity could not be self-perceived or perceived by 
others in terms independent and underivable from those defining the systemic whole.  
It will thus be an overly simplified view of the traditional caste system, if it holds 
that in it the distinct and hierarchically ordered communities lived a completely localized 
existence and had their identities constituted by statuses they occupied. In the system of   8 
 
 
graded dominance no community, not even the one at the top, enjoyed absolute power. 
Each dominating group was entitled to only one type (intellectual or political or 
economic) power, which again percolated downward to other similar communities. This 
allowed many communities, despite hierarchical differences, to interact with each other 
in horizontal spaces marked by a degree of mutuality and cooperation among them. In 
this system of hierarchy each community was simultaneously a status group and an 
autonomous community in its own right. A community also developed some kind of a 
social capital for itself, ironically, through performing specific roles and developing 
specialized skills and crafts assigned to it in the hierarchy. But this contributed also to the 
growth of social assets for the community and imparted it with some specially 
identifiable psycho-cultural characteristics. These characteristics and assets cumulatively 
formed a basis of a cultural recognition of the community—often in terms independent of 
its status in the social hierarchy—and of its social mobility. All this allowed/encouraged 
every community, irrespective of its location in the hierarchy, to construct its special 
‘history’ and build legends justifying its autonomous existence in a non-hierarchical, 
horizontal space and the place of pride it held in the society.  
A community also maintained a degree of political and social governance for 
itself, and evolved mechanisms and procedures for settlements of disputes within it and 
of resolving conflicts vis-à-vis the other communities. The political authority of the state 
wherever and in whatever form it existed (King, an oligarchy, ruling council, a 
panchayat) was usually negatively defined as the one charged with preventing major 
transgressions or defiance of the generally and conventionally recognized social and 
economic codes of the system as a whole. It also sought to prevent the use of raw power   9 
 
 
or unsanctioned dominance by one community over the other. In short, operating within 
the rules of an ascriptively ordered hierarchy, (rather by constantly bending these rules) 
the communities were able to find large social and economic spaces, and acquire 
distinctive cultural identities for themselves. 
To conclude, in this hierarchically ordered world of communities, contrary to 
common belief, no community was expected to live, or really lived, with a hierarchically 
defined (caste) unidimensional identity. Probably that made it possible for the system to 
constantly accommodate immigrant and invading ethnic groups as well as the ever arising 
new occupational groups, in the system’s flexible hierarchy. It even made possible for 
some of them to move vertically upward in the hierarchy and be structurally a part of the 
ruling status groups. To put it differently, the communities did not live in a prison house 
of identities; just as they detached and reattached themselves with statuses, they also 
discarded the old and donned new identities, through their movements in time and space. 
 
The Colonial Caste 
Along with being simultaneously caste-hierarchical and multi-ethnic, the South Asian 
societies shared in common two other historically interrelated conditions: the colonial 
past and the modernity sponsored by the colonial regime and processed through the 
ideological and institutional structures of colonialism.  
This dialectic between the hierarchically ordered multi-ethnic society and colonial 
modernity sustained and even further developed the caste-like features of exclusion in 
these societies, which were only partially blunted or mitigated by the ongoing processes 
of urbanization and industrialization.[Susan Bayly] Even the religious and political   10 
 
 
differences which eventually led to formation of different types of states in these 
societies, did not affect the nature of exclusion they shared among them. 
The structure of exclusion that developed during the colonial rule in the South 
Asian societies had the following common features. 
1.  A small middle class whose members were almost exclusively drawn from 
communities occupying higher statuses (the dvijas) in the traditional caste/feudal 
hierarchies, but had acquired (mainly by virtue of their inherited statuses) modern 
(English) education and “family traditions” of serving in (colonial) Government 
administration, the military, or of owning large businesses and/or lands or 
following modern professions.[B.B. Misra] They usually, but not necessarily, 
belonged to a homogenous and empowered linguistic group but invariably had 
English as their second, if not first, language. The class remained culturally 
exclusionary and socially stagnant; the members of the erstwhile non-dvija 
communities could rarely enter it.[A.R. Desai] 
2.  A vast majority of the socially and culturally subordinated population of the 
ethnically diverse agricultural and artisan communities occupying lower and 
subaltern statuses in the traditional caste/feudal hierarchies and whose members 
were engaged in agricultural labour, in skilled and semi-skilled jobs and some at 
lower-level jobs in military and Government administration.[Galanter] They 
remained systematically unexposed to modern English education and usually 
belonged to a majority language group in the society. The colonial regime 
enumerated, classified and characterized these communities in a variety of ways, 
affording them a self-perception of an “oppressed majority”.[G. Omvett]   11 
 
 
3.  A demographically dispersed minority consisting of numerically smaller 
communities of the excluded and culturally deprived people. They belonged to 
communities that were traditionally confined to the peripheries of these societies 
and were now officially enumerated and classified by the colonial regime as 
nomadic tribes, criminal tribes, the hill tribes, the untouchable communities of 
scavengers, leather workers and groups of weavers etc. Members of these 
communities remained far removed from modern education and were generally 
denied any cultural opportunity to access modernity and its institutional 
advantages. Members of these communities were engaged in different types of 
low paid or sometimes even unpaid (forced labour) works, such as scavenging, 
skinning and tanning of leather, landless labour, manual and unskilled jobs. In 
short, members of these communities remained systematically confined to such 
works when the society as a whole was experiencing significant degrees of 
modernization and industrialization, all on account of their traditional social and 
cultural exclusion.[Ambedkar] 
  This aspect of the exclusionary structures in South Asia has lent a distinct 
character to poverty in the region: where social segregation and cultural 
deprivation is a cause of poverty and not its consequence, with the result that 
poverty has remained systematically confined for centuries to certain social 
groups. Its occurrence is not random. 
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The in Post-Colonial Caste: Emergence of Ethno-Political Dimensions 
Decolonisation radically changed the context in which the above structure of exclusion 
had survived in the South Asian societies. It created such moral, ideological and 
structural compulsions for the traditionally dominant groups that they could not have 
maintained their power in the society and the political hold they had acquired over the 
new independent states by insisting on maintaining the social-cultural status quo and not 
address conditions of social inequality and cultural divisiveness in their societies. In fact, 
decolonisation that came after decades of modernization and social and political 
movements of the oppressed had already caused pervasive refutation of the ideology of 
(caste) exclusion and loosening of the hierarchical structures. The changes produced 
some direct consequences for the caste-colonial structures of exclusion.[Omvett, Gail.] 
First, the ruling elites still consisting of the traditionally dominant communities 
but now also wielding the state power, could no longer depend or take for granted their 
inherited statuses, as a permanent resource for legitimating their rule. The continuation of 
rule by these elites in the modern, independent state required that they monopolize the 
means of accessing modernity (esp. through designing for this purpose the educational 
and language policies) and receive at the same time support from a large number of 
people (the ‘oppressed majority’) in the society; irrespective of the fact whether that state 
was democratic or not. Of course, if it were a democratic state—where peoples’ consent 
to their rule was mandatory and required to be regularly obtained—it became necessary 
for the ruling elites to incorporate/co-opt in significant numbers members of the hitherto 
subordinated communities into the power structure. In any event the logic of the modern 
state, democratic or otherwise, required that the rulers practised such politics and devised   13 
 
 
the policies that kept the people on their side, at the least checked the resentment and 
dissatisfaction that inevitably grew on account of the rising aspirations among them. 
Second, the vast number of agricultural and artisan communities traditionally 
occupying subaltern statuses had not just become aware but were keen to assert their 
new, collective political identity of “oppressed people” consisting a numerical majority. 
Released from the acuteness of hierarchical pressures they, on the one hand, had 
recovered and begun to assert their separate caste-community based identities (often 
competing and conflicting among themselves in the social and economic realms) and, on 
the other, find or create any occasion to forging larger multi-caste, ethno-political 
conglomerations (e.g., the ‘dalits’, the ‘backward castes’ etc.) and assert their numerical 
power in politics. In any event, this large mass of people, acutely aware of its new 
political value, became the most coveted political object of appeasement as well as of 
manipulation even as it became available for all manners of campaigns for social and 
political mobilization. It became increasingly difficult for the ruling elites to act in pure 
self-interest in politics. They could not formulate any new social and cultural policies or 
launch mobilizational campaigns to demonstrate a majority support to such policies or a 
‘cause’, without taking interest of these various conglomerations of communities into 
account, even if such acts sometimes went against the ruling elites’ own perceived 
interests. In short, after decolonisation the erstwhile subordinated communities in a South 
Asian society although remained economically poor, became politically empowered 
people, without whose support the ruling elite (even a dictatorship) could not feel 
confident about its power.   14 
 
 
Third, although constituting a substantial mass of multi-caste conglomerate the 
socially excluded and culturally deprived communities of the third sector (the dalits) did 
not really experience the moment of decolonisation. Their dispersed demography made 
that all the more difficult for them. With the withdrawal of the colonial regime they now 
came under direct pressure of the ruling elites and other dominant communities, and were 
induced to accept their leadership in politics. Besides their traditional exclusion their 
smaller numbers and dispersed demography prevented them from organizing themselves 
politically effectively. They could participate in politics under patronage of the upper-
status groups, and their representation in power became possible usually by proxy—
assumed by or given to the rulers.  
In some South Asian societies where the state was not democratic and had itself 
donned a religious-nationalist identity, either suppressed or made invisible the cultural 
identities of excluded communities. In the democratic states, although these communities 
were enumerated and classified for receiving benefits of policies like affirmative action, 
they for a long time, i.e. until they acquired political salience of their own through 
aggressive and organized participation in politics, had to remain reconciled to the politics 
of proxy and patronage. Even when they acquired political salience and began to assert 
their rights and cultural identities, they often got into conflicts and met with violence 








Nation-building as a Model of Social Inclusion 
It was in response to this radically changed social and political context that the new 
ruling elites in the South Asian societies were virtually compelled to create a much wider 
base for renewal and acceptance of their rule in the society. Even a more compelling 
reason was the challenge, rather an impending crisis,[Ref. Huntington] that the new states 
faced soon after decolonisation, threatening stability, and for some even their existence. 
This was the crisis created by relentless, violent conflicts among the various ethno-
religious and ethno-linguistic communities that, released from the hierarchical pressures 
and the colonial political management, were now competing for power. Faced with this 
situation the leadership of the new states now increasingly ceased to see diversity as a 
way of life to be celebrated; they rather saw it as a source of religious, linguistic and 
ethnic strife. 
Seen in the above context it is not surprising that the leadership of different South 
Asian societies saw in the model of ‘nation-building’ a panacea for all their problems. It 
provided a modern ideological basis for unification of their population into a national 
society and for their new states to acquire a national identity—an identity overriding all 
other identities in the society.  
There, obviously was no question of choosing this model; it was a model given to 
all new, decolonised societies. For, as the then prevailing global political wisdom had it: 
a post-colonial modern state was incomplete, both in its nationhood and modernity, until 
it became a national state, in the European mould.[Sheth] The idea of building a nation, 
was also upheld as an ultimate goal to be achieved by the freedom movements in the   16 
 
 
South Asian societies. It had become an object of popular aspiration whose realisation 
was seen as synonymous with achieving Independence. But after Independence the ruling 
elites in these societies needed this idea even more desperately than they probably did 
during their Independence movements; they saw in it a great potential for eliciting 
support of the new majority of the subalterns, to their rule.  
The leadership of the new states, thus posited nation-building as an overall goal of 
the state policies and of making their societies egalitarian and inclusive. It was seen as a 
‘continuous process’ of mobilization that would keep a majority of the people politically 
involved, hopefully, without threatening the stability of their own rule—even in a 
democracy. At a more general level, the model was seen as a paradigm of social 
transformation. It was expected to detach vast populations of these ‘traditional’ societies 
from their segmented, parochial milieus and induce them, through process of massive 
political and social mobilization, to enter as ‘one people’ the new world of modern 
governance (of a democratic nation-state), and technologically empowered 
economy.[Karl Deutsch, et. al.] This process was visualized to be initiated through 
policies of the state, and sustained through mobilizational politics in the society. It held 
special attraction for the ascriptively iniquitous and now ‘conflict-ridden’ South Asian 
societies, for it was expected to demolish the barriers dividing the communities, and 
include them all in the new homogenous whole of a national society. It was further 
expected that through this process their unstable states will acquire a unified cultural 
basis for their rule in the society.[Gellner] 
   17 
 
 
South Asian Nation-building: A Model of Inclusion or Exclusion? 
Working under historical and cultural conditions radically different from those which 
gave rise to nation-states in Europe, the South Asian countries found the task of building 
an inclusive national society and retain at the same time the autonomy and neutrality of 
the state—crucial, among other things, for protecting cultural identities and rights of 
minorities—not just difficult but almost an insurmountable task. In the course of coping 
with this dilemma two different approaches to nation-building emerged: Nation-building 
through (a) ethno-majoritarian state or (b) through ethno-neutral state. 
  
Pakistan and Bangladesh: 
 
Following the first approach the leadership of some countries soon yielded to the 
temptation of seeking popular support to their newly created regimes by politically 
catering to the majoritarian ethno-religious sentiments and ended up by aligning their 
states with an ethno-religious identity. This became evident in Pakistan, when the ruling 
elites ignoring the wishes and advice of its founder, kept on with the old politics of ethno-
religious mass mobilization and ended up making Pakistan an Islamic nation-state. Such 
politics of building an ethno-religiously inclusive and homogenous national society, in 
fact, produced negative, exclusionary consequences. First, it resulted in severe 
discrimination of the miniscule religious minorities, especially of Hindus and Christians 
(whatever numbers that survived after the Partition) resulting into suppression of their 
political rights and cultural identities. [Ref.] Second, perhaps because of negligible 
presence of the non-Muslim minorities in the country new minorities began to be 
identified and targeted from the old, and original majority in whose name the homeland 
of Pakistan was created. [Nandy, A] The Ahmedis and the Mohajirs. This has unleashed   18 
 
 
what looks like a continuous process of minoritization [Gupta] of sections of people who 
initially belonged to the majority. The provincial majorities now began to emerge as new 
minorities on the basis of ethno-linguistic identification (e.g. the Sindhis) as also the 
denominational divisions (e.g. the Shias). Decades latter, East Pakistan whose population 
constituted a majority of the Pakistanis at the national level, but was ethno-linguistically 
different (Bengali), territorially separated and politically dominated, began to defy its 
Islamic (religious) nationhood and assert its Bangla national (linguistic) identity. The 
result was creation of another Muslim-majority state in the region, but founded on the 
principle of ethno-linguistic nationhood.  
Soon after its separation from Pakistan, the leadership that had led the ethno-
linguistic national movement for Independence of Bangla Desh was brutally removed 
from power by a militant Islamist faction of the movement, claiming to represent the 
‘oppressed majority’ of the Muslim Bangladeshis.[Ref.] This unleashed a high-intensity 
politics of mass mobilization resulting in Islam becoming formally and constitutionally 
the religion of the state and the defining feature of its national identity. The result has 
been suppression of political rights and cultural identities of the Hindu, Chakma and Garo 
minorities of Bangla Desh.[Mohsin] In sum, the state in these countries could not retain 
its autonomy and neutrality in the process of creating a ‘nation’ as it was increasingly 
seen in majoritarian cultural or religious terms. The consequence of all this has been 
severe social and cultural exclusion of minorities.  
The lesson to draw from the nation-building experience of Pakistan and 
Bangladesh: once the state aligned itself to either a cultural or religious majority it could 
sustain itself only by subjugation, even disenfranchisement and expulsion of the cultural   19 
 
 
minorities however defined—in religious, linguistic or ethnic terms. Pursuit of such 
policies and politics, by the ethno-cultural state could even lead to its own decapitation 
when a territorially based and numerically strong ethnicity suffering exclusion asserts its 
‘nationhood’ and eventually demand a separate state for itself. [I shall not elaborate any 
further on the kind of policies and politics the ethno-religious states in these countries 
have promoted, and their impact for the cultural and political survival of the minorities, 
as this theme is to be dealt in another HDR paper.] With respect to the role of policies, it 
is sufficient at this point to make a broad inference: the policies of affirmative action 
designed to enable equal participation and cultural identities of the minorities are not 
integral to the nation-building design of an ethno-majoritarian state. Whenever they 
promulgate affirmative action kind of policies, which they indeed do in some specific 
contexts, the policies almost invariably result in benefiting members of the ethno-
religious majority. Occasionally, when genuine efforts are made to reach out to the non-
religiously defined communities (linguistic of regional minorities) the policies meet with 
stiff, often even violent opposition from members of the elite (themselves the ideologues 
of the ethno-religious state) making them (the policies) virtually defunct and unworkable 
in practice. 
 
  Sri Lanka and India: 
The countries that adopted the second approach to nation-building in South Asia, 
i.e. of establishing and maintaining an ethno-neutral state as an agency for national 
integration and economic development, found the task even more challenging. The first 
and foremost challenge, rather a nightmare, the leadership of these countries faced was to 
cope with the ever present possibility of the politically awakened, but culturally insecure   20 
 
 
and marginalized ethnic communities organizing themselves into an ethno-political 
majority through movements of mass mobilization.  
Second, the ethno-neutral identity the leadership of these countries gave to their 
new states was conceived as being integral to the democratic state. This meant that the 
mobilizational politics would proceed, and in fact it did, on pre-existing lines of ethnicity 
in these societies. In fact collective pursuits of power by the politically organized 
caste/ethnic communities became a permanent feature of competitive-representative 
politics, especially of the party system in these countries. At one level, such caste/ethnic 
politics are eminently manageable in a democracy but that requires a sustained process of 
democratisation. By politicising the traditional caste/ethnic identities and organizations 
democracy could transform (and, in fact, to a considerable extent it has) their socially and 
culturally opaque character by making them responsive to growing secular aspirations of 
their members. In this process, many such entities have forged in these countries larger 
political-social coalitions with other castes and ethnicities, all together assuming broader 
political-cultural identities. The result has been that the claim to power by these broad-
based caste-ethnic formations has become more credible and effective in larger politics. 
At another level, however, the ethno-neutral democratic state in these countries lives with 
a permanent threat that the process of forming larger, broad-based caste/ethnic political 
organizations may give rise to ethno-religious nationalist backlash to what is perceived as 
permissive minoritism, resulting into formation of an ethno-majoritarian state. (India, in 
fact, is currently undergoing through such a phase of democratic politics.)  
Third, the ruling elites of these newly independent countries (usually bearing the 
caste-colonial character: traditionally upper-status, westernised—English educated and   21 
 
 
politically liberal) faced a complex situation for themselves: balancing the need for 
retaining their own power over the state and keeping their commitment to liberal 
democratic values which involved progressive inclusion of the hitherto excluded 
populous sections of the society into the power-structure of the independent democratic 
state.  In practice it meant keeping the ascendant subaltern ethnic majority (a potential 
support for ethno-religious majoritarianism) politically constantly involved, but not 
allowing it to become a serious contender to the state power which could happen if they 
acquire ethno-religious identity. To put it differently, the success or failure of the ethno-
neutral democratic state for nation-building, as we shall see presently with the examples 
of Sri Lanka and India, depended on the kind of policies and politics the ruling elites in 
these countries initiated and sustained after Independence.  
Sri Lanka: The Sri Lankan leadership (a small, top-level social coalition of the 
upper status, urban, English educated and modernist Sinhalese and Tamil elites) whom 
the power was transferred at Independence was committed to secular, democratic values 
and had significant experience of democratic governance.[M.K. de-Silva] The colonial 
regime, since as early as in 1931, had delegated administrative powers to the leaders 
elected by universal suffrage. This leadership had by and large dispensed governance, 
with considerable pragmatism and a sense of accommodation vis-à-vis different ethnic 
communities, through several elections till Independence. It was itself committed to 
liberal, democratic values and was constitutionally bound, not to allow any ethno-
religious considerations in the functioning of the government. Soon after independence 
when the electorate became widely and nationally expanded, the political parties began to 
mobilize their prospective supporters by appealing to the ethnic-majoritarian sentiments   22 
 
 
and aspirations of the Buddhist-Sinhalese majority, which so far had remained dormant 
but were now brought to the fore of Sri Lankan politics.  
The ruling elite, divided in two major political parties (UNP & SLFP)
[FN] 
alternated in power from election to election. In this process they began to make what 
then appeared to be symbolic, but “necessary” concessions to the emergent cultural 
majority of the Sinhalese-Buddhists. Fortunately, this politics of symbolic appeasement 
of the cultural majority
[FN P. deSouze] did not come in their way of pursuing the social and 
welfare policies they had initiated when they worked in colonial government in their 
capacity of elected representatives or as bureaucrats. They not only remained committed 
to these policies, but effectively implemented them by dispensing free universal 
education, extensive health care, subsidies on food and public transport and so on. All 
this brought about remarkable increases in literacy rates, reduction in infant mortality, 
substantial improvement in life expectancy (the famous Physical Quality of Life (PQL) 
index). The figures compared reasonably well with many European countries. The 
policies embraced the entire population, even as the country registered a low level of per 
capita income. This constitutionally established ethno-neutral welfare state functioning in 
a multi-party system survived a military coup (in 1962) and a Leftist insurrection (in 
1971).[Manor] 
But all along, during this process, an undercurrent of ethnic-majoritarian 
aspiration to acquire state power also survived. The Sinhalese-Buddhist masses saw 
coming of Independence and of democracy, as the power of the state coming to them. 
Thanks to increased material needs and aspirations—caused largely by the welfare and 
other economic-distributive policies of the state—not backed by requisite economic   23 
 
 
growth, seem to have contributed to an acute sense of relative deprivation among the 
majority, which now saw itself as constituting ‘the nation’. They attributed their 
condition of deprivation to not having the state-power that, they believed, was due to 
them. They saw the Tamil-Sinhalese ruling coalition not only as a bunch of manipulators 
of power but people who denied the (Sinhalese-Buddhist) national culture a place of 
pride in their ‘own country’.[Ref.]  
Although six parliamentary elections took place between 1956 and 1977, the 
competing parties, the UNP and SLFP, led by the same class of elites divided on party 
lines, now became increasingly inclined to respond to populist majoritarian demands. In 
this process a kind of inter-party competitive majoritarianism took over the old self-
perceived politics of ‘responsible elitism’. In the absence of a well thought out positive 
affirmative action policy, the political system could not gradualize, let alone diffuse, 
what came as a sudden and massive incursion of raw majoritarian power into the 
institutions of democratic governance, upsetting the normal democratic ethos of parties. 
The social coalition of the Sinhalese-Tamil elites began to collapse with a section of 
Sinhalese political elite shifting their allegiance, through successive elections, to the 
growing Sinhalese-Buddhist majoritarian movement. This movement had begun in form 
of pro-vernacular, anti-western protests against the use of English language in public 
institutions and for restoration of indigenous Sri Lankan cultural values and 
organizations, and, ironically, was then joined by some Tamil elites.[Manor] But during 
the 1980’s the movement became a basis for cultural and political mobilization against 
the Tamil minority, resulting in massive violent attacks on the Tamils. One such riot took   24 
 
 
place even as back as in 1958, the ‘normal phase’ of electoral politics, but that was seen 
more as an aberration than representing a trend.  
Since the late 1970’s, however, periodic mass scale violence against the Tamil 
minority almost became a means of expanding and consolidating the Sinhalese-Buddhist 
majoritarian movement culminating in the most barbarous attacks of 1983, during which 
elements within the state appeared to collaborate, more openly and directly than before, 
with the perpetrators of violence, sabotaging all efforts and initiatives of the moderate 
sections of the ruling Sinhalese elite keen to address the Tamil hurt and evolve a durable 
accommodative political arrangement.[Manor] The formally and constitutionally 
established state of Independent Sri Lanka which had its identity as a multi-ethnic secular 
state, was altered by the successive constitutions of 1972 and 1978 which enjoined the 
State to give prominence to Buddhism and to “protect and foster” the religion. But after 
1983 anti-Tamil violence, Sri Lankan state seems to have become irreversibly an ethnic-
majoritarian state, where the Tamil minority will have to find its own political 
arrangement within, more likely outside, the existing Sri Lankan state. In short, the 
constitutionally altered state promulgated many educational, language and cultural 
policies causing almost total alienation of the Tamils and severe exclusionary 
consequences for the other smaller minorities. The worst outcome of this process has 
been adoption of terrorism by the Tamil Elam movement as a means of establishing a 
Tamil national state (the Tamil Elam). The inexorable logic of building ethno-national 
state is least likely to end this mutually destructive ‘politics’ of ethnocide, even if the 
Sinhalese and Tamils are separated in two different states; for in each state there still will   25 
 
 
be significant numbers of the minority of the ‘others’, i.e. Sinhalese in the Tamil state and 
vice versa.  
To conclude, the Sri Lankan state which was constitutionally established as a 
secular democratic state and whose leadership was committed to maintain the institution 
of representative democracy and was oriented to human development kind of thinking in 
devising its welfare policies could not withhold for long against the ethno-majoritarian 
mobilizational pressures in politics. (Lessons for India?) This severe attenuation of ethno-
neutrality and autonomy of the Sri Lankan state took place, in my view, largely because 
of the ruling elite’s inability to expand the power by devising social and cultural policies 
of diffusion and inclusion of the rising subaltern majority. The consequences were: the 
removal from power of the upper-status caste-colonial coalition of the ruling elite; 
mobilizational inclusion of the upper as well as lower caste/classes as well as cooptation 
of some smaller minorities in the expanding Sinhalese-Buddhist majority; ruthless 
suppression of leftist insurrections and almost total alienation of the Tamil minority 
taking recourse to violent means for having a separate state for itself, and severe neglect 
of rights of some other minorities. Strange though it may seem, all this happened in the 
process of the democratic welfarist state, building a nation for itself. The lesson to draw 
from this experience: Even for a secular democratic state, with a territorially based ethno-
linguistic/religious minority, building of an inclusive national society requires that 
special policies and programmes are evolved ensuring autonomy to such an ethnicity at 
the regional level through federal arrangements of sharing power at the national level. 
Even a more important lesson, as we shall see presently, the state must view the policy of 
Affirmative Action as an anticipatory measure and implement it proactively in order to   26 
 
 
ensure participation and share in the political and bureaucratic power by the culturally 
deprived and socially excluded communities—these be the minorities or even a majority. 
India: Unlike some other countries in the region, India chose not to adopt, 
constitutionally and politically, a religion-based, majoritarian-ethnic state of the Hindus 
(82 per cent), a Hindu rashtra, as a means of nation-building. The leadership of 
independent India to whom the power was transferred (the upper-caste English educated, 
liberal-modernist) rejected religion as the basis of either state formation or nation-
building. Instead, it chose to have a liberal, secular state governed by a democratic 
Constitution and a nation conceived as a territorial-political community of citizens. In 
effect, it legitimised and charged the agency of the state to build the nation premised on 
political unity within which communities with diverse cultural identities could survive, 
even flourish. It is in this context that the Constitution, departing from the textbook 
definition of a uni-cultural nation-state, established both, the collective rights of 
communities to maintaining cultural identities and to pursue religious freedoms and 
individual rights of civil liberty to all citizens, as fundamental rights. 
The Constitution thus not only explicitly rejected religion, language, or any other 
ethnic criterion for creating and maintaining a political majority to ensure the stability 
and legitimacy of the new state, it even ruled out federalism as a means of distributing 
power among the ethno-linguistically-based territorial provinces. Instead, it mapped out 
large multiethnic and multilingual provincial states as constituting political-
administrative units of a quasi-federal state, called the Union of India. Such non-
recognition of ethno-linguistic identities in governance, only five years after the 
Constitution came in force, gave rise to strong and widespread movements demanding re-  27 
 
 
organization of provincial states into ethno-linguistic states. The movements compelled 
the central Government—despite the opposition of the ruling Congress party and 
particularly of the Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru to this demand—to reorganize 
provincial states on linguistic basis in the late 1950s and early 1960s. The ethno-linguistic 
movements which were then seen as a threat to the idea of India as a homogenous nation-
state, were thus effectively dealt with, thanks to the open, competitive politics through 
which the linguistic identities could articulate themselves and even change the ruling 
elite’s idea of a unitary nation-state for India. By using a rather long-drawn democratic 
institutional procedure of forming the commission for state reorganization, holding public 
hearings and the ruling elites themselves taking electoral sense of the ‘popular mood’ the 
policy of forming ethno-linguistic provincial states was adopted and implemented over a 
decade.  
Similarly, the problems of persistent social inequality and exclusion arising from 
divisions based on caste hierarchy and ethnic identifications were redefined by the state, 
in new non-ritual terms, i.e. such were seen divisions as constituting a problem for the 
state of achieving political equality and social justice. This new discourse sustained by 
democratic politics had many outcomes: (a) it prevented the emergent majority of the 
populous, subaltern communities from aggregating and acquiring majoritarian political-
religious identity; (b) it brought the emergent caste and ethnic conflicts within the ambit 
of social policies of the state and; (c) it encouraged and induced diverse and conflicting 
communities to process their social and cultural problems through the open, competitive 
politics of elections and parties. Thus, over time, thanks to the functioning of the ethno-
religiously autonomous and democratic state, the conflictual relations among   28 
 
 
communities based on caste, ethnicity and language became integral to the normal 
politics of multi-party, competitively representative democracy.  
Thus, the Indian ruling elites conceived nation-building as a state-driven process, 
through which it sought to bring about economic development, social transformation and 
cultural integration of the country as a whole. In this pro-active process the leadership 
saw the multi-ethnic character of the society as a passive cultural ‘context’; rather than it 
representing any active principle that could interrogate even raise protest against the 
ruling elite preference for the homogenizing model of national unity. The expectation 
was that the universalization of citizenship rights and the induction of the cultural 
pluralities into the democratic process of open and competitive politics would evolve 
new, civic equations among ethnic communities and between them and the state. At the 
same time, it was also expected that the cultural communities would, in the process of 
nation-building, maintain their distinctive identities, even as their individual members 
exercised their rights as citizens and, often even of exit from communitarian pressures. 
This approach to nation-building has served India so far, reasonably well. Firstly, 
it helped the Indian state in maintaining its integrity and the nation its inclusive, multi-
ethnic character. It on the whole, helped the state in managing ethnic conflicts arising 
from conflicting claims to political power, made by various regional, linguistic, religious 
and caste-oriented groups. And, at the same time, such pressures arising from democratic 
politics has restrained the built-in tendency of the state to centralize power and 
homogenize cultures. In responding to these pressures the Indian state has shown or has 
been compelled to show, considerable flexibility; for example, by forming newer and 
smaller states as well as autonomous state-councils in some tribal regions, by devising the   29 
 
 
policy of affirmative action for communities of ex-untouchables, the tribals and the socially 
and educationally backward classes (the political and social impacts of which we shall 
discuss later), and lately by initiating the process of devolution of power to the provincial 
states and, more importantly, to the village panchatyats. Thus, in practice, the state-centred 
project of nation-building has all along been subjected to the dialectics of democratic 
politics and social movements. It is through this process of nation-building that the 
democratic and secular state has been linked to the idea of India as a multi-ethnic nation.  
The model, however, has not been able to address effectively to the issue of ensuring 
equal access to means of achieving social equality. Primarily because the ruling elite 
(English-educated upper-caste) while found the promulgation of affirmative action 
cognitively necessary and morally self-appeasing for inclusive nation-building, its 
implementation, as we shall see later, always remained tardy and often even dishonest. This 
bias showed in the elites not connecting affirmative action with other policies that were 
theoretically conceived by them as a part of the larger vision of inclusive nation-building; 
they responded by improvising such policy connections only when democratic pressures 
threatening their rule were mounted through movements. For example the education 
policies, despite laudable recommendations of many commissions has all along favoured the 
urban, upper-caste English-educated sections of the population, enabling their social and 
physical (international) mobility, but resulting in massive illiteracy for the members of the 
poor, lower status communities. Massive financial allocations were made for higher 
education, to which the poor did not have much access. This prevented them from 
effectively availing the benefits of affirmative action. Similarly, it took decades and virulent 
protests from linguistic minorities to achieve a degree of stability and consensus to evolve a   30 
 
 
language policy that has now found a degree of consensus and stability. Yet, many problems 
remain, which by and large are being dealt with through the process of democratic politics 
and evolving federalism. (For data on language policy see Sheth, also Sumi Krishna.) 
The model has also produced some negative consequences for national integration. 
More specifically, it has all along failed to cope with the territorially based ethnic and ethno-
religious movements for political autonomy and separate nation-statehood in the border 
regions of the North East and in the Kashmir valley. People in these regions have seen 
mainly the coercive face of the Indian nation-state. Over time this has produced violent 
ethnic conflicts and insurgencies often leading to expulsion, and even annihilation of 
minorities from these areas by the militant ethnic movements. Unless radical modifications 
and innovations are made by the ruling elites in the structure of governance (through 
innovative federal arrangements) for these regions, making it responsive simultaneously to 
ethnic and developmental aspirations of the people, the model’s claim to success (i.e. 
inclusive nation-building) would remain suspect. 
A more serious threat to this model has emerged in recent years, from the ethno-
religious majoritarian movement of Hindutva, a movement that has been kept at bay for 
over half a century, among other things, by the affirmative action policies accompanied by 
the social movements of dalits and the backward classes for social justice. But now the 
movement of Hindutva is threatening to create a rupture in the ongoing, even if slow and 
piecemeal process of political and cultural inclusion of the historically deprived and 
excluded communities. The model of inclusive nation-building of which affirmative action 
policies constituted a centrepiece, indeed established a rather firm, constitutionally 
institutionalised structural linkage between the secular, liberal-democratic state and the idea   31 
 
 
of India as a plural, multi-ethnic society. This linkage is now sought to be disrupted by the 
Hindutva movement.  
The Hindutva movement was launched in unison by various Hindu nationalist 
organizations in the early 1980s. Although the ideology of Hindutva was propounded by 
V.D. Savarkar during the Independence Movement, it all along lay dormant and failed to 
attract any significant support from the Hindus. Even today, despite their strong missionary 
zeal the Hindu nationalists find it difficult to sale the idea of Hindutva to a majority of 
Hindus. They rely more on the politics of discourse and of electoral alignments in the hope 
that someday in the future they can make Hindutva the ideology of the Indian state. 
Accordingly, The politics of Hindutva is addressed to detaching the idea of India as a 
pluralist ‘nation’ from the state, and redefining India as representing a unitary nation of the 
Hindus—a Hindu Rashtra. The movement’s long-term objective is, thus, to make the Indian 
state dependent for its legitimacy, on the idea of unitary nationalism symbolized in Hindu 
Rashtra. Put simply, Hindutva seeks to legitimise ethno-religious majoritarianism, in the 
name of cultural nationalism, and re-shape the Indian state in majority-ethnic terms. In my 
view this project of Hindu nationalists is unlikely to succeed nationally, despite their 
political party—the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) leading a multi-party coalition centrally 
and is a ruling party in some states at the provincial level. Even the recent savage attacks by 
the activists of the Hindutva movement on the Muslim minority in Gujarat aided and abetted 
by the provincial state, is not likely to help it to achieve its cynical objective. Firstly, because 
Hindutva ideology is against the grain of all that Hinduism and modern India is about. 
Second, the heterogeneity of interests and identities among Hindus would not allow their 
political mobilization on a sustained basis on the issue like Hindutva. In the competitive   32 
 
 
politics of representative democracy these identities and interests are difficult to be 
aggregated and patterned in any single, ideological direction. Thirdly, and most importantly, 
the emergence of strong, countervailing political forces as a consequence of fifty years of 
affirmative action policies. Among other things these have given rise to several regional 
political parties, many of them led by the aggressive anti-Hindutva leadership of the 
subaltern majorities, stubbornly preventing the political consolidation of the Hindus.[Sheth]  
If, however, for some reason this established model of nation-building, allowing for 
democratically processed incremental inclusion fails, and the Hindutva movement succeeds 
in cultivating a long-term political support of the majority of Hindus, the Indian nation-state 
would acquire, without doubt, the character of a majoritarian-ethnic state which would then 
treat its minorities like other such states in the sub-continent. In that event, the Indian 
enterprise of building a politically inclusive and culturally plural modern nation-state would 
be shown as having failed. 
New threats, besides Hindutva, have also emerged. The state driven model of nation-
building is now itself undergoing radical changes as it faces the newly emergent forces of 
globalism from above, and regionalism (in form of ethnic and political-religious assertions) 
from below. In this process of change entirely a new set of issues—such as of ‘national 
sovereignty’ and preservation of indigenous cultures and lifestyles—have been inserted in 
the old discourse of nation-building, creating far-reaching implications for the concept of 
nation-building itself. I shall not elaborate this point here, as it falls outside the scope of this 
paper. I however would wish to suggest that this change is likely to produce, in fact is in the 
process of producing, qualitatively different forms of exclusion by introducing a new 
dimension of cultural division globally, and in every national society: the metropolitan   33 
 
 
world of globalised elites and its vast peripheries of the vernacular masses. In this process 
the poor are increasingly becoming ‘invisible’ and poverty being seen as the poor peoples’ 
own failure, rather than a moral issue.[Sheth] 
 
III 
Affirmative Action: The South Asian Context 
Only few countries in South Asia adopted Affirmative Action policies, each in response 
to some special situations/problems it faced in the course of nation-building. 
Accordingly, the policy has produced different consequences in different countries. As 
we shall see presently, the countries where the policy was explicitly conceived as a 
means of removing persistent conditions of structural exclusion that caused injustice and 
deprivation to people of certain communities and regions and was administered by ethno-
neutral and democratic state, it has enormously contributed to making the society more 
inclusive, even equitous. On the other hand, in countries where the policy was adopted 
and implemented by an ethno-majoritarian state (democratic or otherwise), even for the 
good reason of uplifting and accommodating the deprived and backward communities 
within the country, it almost invariably ended up as an instrument for appeasing the 
ethno-religious majority and discrimination of the minorities. 
In Pakistan [M. Waseem] the policy was conceived, firstly as a means of 
correcting the prevailing, sharp inter-regional economic and cultural imbalances, and 
secondly, to alleviate depressed economic and cultural conditions in which a majority 
within a particular region lived, e.g. the rural areas of Sindh. The policy provided for a 
modest (i.e. proportionally much less than the population size) degree of representation in   34 
 
 
government services to residents of backward regions (in reality the territorially based 
ethno-linguistic minorities) and the populous community of Bengalis in East Pakistan 
where a majority of Pakistanis lived in conditions of physical and cultural separation. The 
distinctive nature of this policy lay in the ethno-majoritarian state not recognizing, in fact 
suppressing, the ethno-cultural differences within the country, resulting in the policy 
makers’ unwillingness to identify beneficiaries of the policy in ethnic or cultural terms, 
and its insistence to use geographical criteria for their identification. In reality, however, 
both the backwardness and discrimination in the Pakistani society were based on ethno-
cultural and feudal-hierarchical identities of communities within the larger Islamic fold. 
The result was a half-hearted and intermittent implementation of the policy. It produced 
deep resentment among the beneficiary groups who felt they did not receive benefits in 
any appreciable measure. These included: people from the Northern (tribal) areas, 
Sindhis, Baluch, the Bengalis and the Kashmiris in Pakistan. Of these, the Bengalis most 
acutely felt that they, despite being a majority, were kept away from the centre of power 
in Pakistan and eventually got themselves a separate nation-state. The policy was 
vociferously opposed by the dominant Punjabi community and the Mohajir minority 
(migrants from India who had led Pakistan movement for a separate homeland for 
Muslims in undivided India). The dominant groups, not only opposed the affirmative 
action policy, however infirm it was, they, being in power, sabotaged it from within in 
various ways, one of them being issuing fake domicile certificates to un-entitled, non-
backward residents of a backward province. Ironically, the non-recognition of the cultural 
and ethnic identities of communities within Islam, the religion of the Pakistani state, led 
to strong ethnic identification by members of the communities who felt being   35 
 
 
discriminated by the policy. The policy’s use of administrative euphemisms for ethnic 
minorities enabled the cornering of advantages by the economically advanced dominant 
groups who were formally opposed to the policy. In short the policy, the way in which it 
was conceived and has been implemented, instead of maintaining national unity, 
contributed, on the one hand, to the rise of the militant (Mohajir) and separatist (Bengali) 
movements, and to diversionary counter-mobilizational and violent movements by the 
sectarian and denominational organizations, on the other. 
It, however, will not be entirely correct to conclude from the above that the policy 
has not worked at all in Pakistan. In fact the phase during its phase of its effective 
implementation after the separation of Bangladesh, particularly between 1973 and 1993, 
the policy achieved its intended objective. It tamed the separatist movements in the 
provinces (especially in Sindh) and gave representation to educated elites of different 
ethno-linguistic provinces in the structure of political and bureaucratic power. [Data-
Table from Waseem] This function is performed even today, insofar as the policy still 
allows such representations, although if in a smaller measure. But this new post-1973 
policy caused an intense feeling of loss of power among the Mohajirs, making their 
movement much more militant. It also could not appreciably reduce the performance of 
the dominant Punjabi community in governance.[Data, Waseem] On the whole, it seems, 
the ethno-religious majoritarian approach to nation-building did not allow the ruling 
elites of Pakistan to draw the right lesson about the policy: its role in making the state 
more stable and the nation a culturally and politically inclusive society. 
In Sri Lanka the affirmative action policy came as late as in 1970, in the wake of 
the ethno-religious (Sinhalese-Buddhist) majoritarian movement. At one level, it was   36 
 
 
aimed at correcting severe rural-urban and ethnic imbalances in utilization of educational 
opportunities and bureaucratic power which for historical reasons had remained tilted in 
the favour of Tamil minority even as it favoured a section of upper status (Goyigami) 
urban Sinhalese. But, at the level of implementation, the policy appeared as a set of too 
swift and sweeping measures, deliberately and viciously targeting interests of the ethno-
lingual minority of the Tamils. This aggravated the ethnic-conflicts, making the policy a 
means of cultivating and consolidating majoritarian support for the competing political 
parties and for the government of the day. Thus the affirmative action policy, the way in 
which it was conceived and the manner in which it was implemented, by the ethno-
majoritarian, democratic state of Sri Lanka, instead of addressing the real need of 
correcting the ethnic imbalance of opportunities and power in the society, contributed to 
the growing ethnic polarization in the society (for details M.K. de-Silva).  
Recently, the Hindu state of Nepal, controlled by its traditional, upper-status elites 
consisting of Bahuns, Chhetris and the Newars, facing Maoist insurrections, has 
awakened to the need for affirmative action policies for the country’s hitherto suppressed 
and made-invisible ethnic minorities and the untouchable communities.[Ref. I. Exp.] It is 
premature to comment on what kind of impact it will have in terms of making the Nepali 
society more or less inclusive, even on whether the policy will at all take off from the 









Affirmative Action in India 
 
The policy of Affirmative Action in India (hereafter to be referred to also by the Indian 
nomenclature: Reservations) is by now an established social policy addressing issues of 
social inequality and marginalization of the numerous communities which, taken 
together, make up a majority of Indians. 
 
  Provisions and Rationale of the Policy: 
The policy provides for reservations of seats in legislative bodies at all levels 
(local, provincial and national), of jobs in government services and seats in educational 
institutions for the socially marginalized and culturally peripheralized sections of the 
population. Reservations is a part of a comprehensive policy package that has evolved in 
India over half a century. The package comprises a series of legislations, ameliorative 
programmes and preferential schemes, explicitly designed to socially and politically 
empower the weaker sections of the society as well as to increase economic opportunities 
for them. The package has been administered by the central as well as the state 
(provincial) governments. Although the history of affirmative action in India dates back 
to the first decade of the Twentieth century,
[FN, Mysore State] the present set of policies, 
including Reservations, derive their legal status and legitimacy from the Indian 
constitution.  
The overall package, now in operation, addresses three sets of policy goals:  
1.  ending of social and religious disabilities suffered by certain specified groups by 
virtue of their social segregation and ritual exclusion (the communities of ex-
untouchables, officially characterized as Scheduled Castes, the SCs) and spatial   38 
 
 
and cultural isolation; (the tribals, officially categories as Scheduled Tribes, the 
STs). 
2.  to facilitating and promoting equal participation of all socially disabled and 
disadvantaged groups (which besides the SCs and STs, in this context include 
communities classified as Other Backward Classes, OBCs comprising a vast 
number of ritually discriminated and culturally deprived agrarian and artisan 
communities) by means of provisions for preferential treatment in education, in 
government employment, and representation in legislative bodies. 
3.  to protect, if necessary through legislative action and executive orders, all these 
groups, also described in the constitution as socially disadvantaged and weaker 
sections of society—generally identified as the backward classes—from all forms 
of social injustice and exploitation. 
 
The overall, long-term goal, as was repeatedly expressed by the policy makers in 
the course of the Constituent Assembly debates, was: building a political community of 
all Indians, based on the principle of social equality.[Ref.] 
In articulating these goals, the policy has over the years widened its scope and 
enlarged its content. Reservations (Affirmative Action) is one of the many avenues that 
have opened up in the pursuit of an equitable social policy. A series of laws (e.g. the 
Untouchability Offences Act of 1955, the Protection of Civil Rights Act of 1976, the 
Prevention of Atrocities Act of 1989—a legislation prescribing severe punitive provisions 
against practice of untouchability—the amended Criminal Tribes Act of 1952 removing 
the legal disabilities suffered by the so-called criminal tribes and legislation to end forced 
labour) have been passed to further the cause of social justice. Protective laws also have   39 
 
 
been passed preventing alienation of land owned by a tribal to any one belonging to a 
non-tribal community, regulating money-lending, and providing debt-relief and legal aid 
to the weaker sections of society. Besides, there are many other promotional schemes and 
programmes for backward classes concerning land allotments, housing, scholarships, 
subsidies and credits aimed at providing physical security as well as promoting 
occupational mobility of these groups. Special laws have also been made providing for 
self-rule arrangements to tribals populating specified territories. 
The most controversial aspect of this overall policy is, however, the provision of 
reservations. Although these provisions are based on the same values and rationale that 
inform other parts of the policy package listed above, their impact is felt adversely and 
directly by those outside the beneficiary groups and that too in the vital area of 
competition for political/bureaucratic power and social mobility where the means are 
always scarce and competition intense. 
 
The Beneficiaries and the Benefits 
The beneficiaries of Reservations comprise three types of communities: (a) ex-
untouchables, (b) tribals and (c) Other Backward Classes; all, together, making about 65 
per cent of the Indian population. In the beneficiary categories are also included the 
deprived and marginalized sections of the religious minorities: Sikhs, Buddhists, 
Christians and the Muslims. 
(a)  Communities of the ex-untouchables: Specific castes/communities who 
traditionally suffered almost total ritual prohibition resulting in their continuing social 
discrimination have been identified, enumerated and listed in every provincial state of   40 
 
 
India and the lists have been consolidated and incorporated in the schedule of the 
Constitution. These communities hence are officially designated as Scheduled Castes 
(SCs). The implicit criterion for inclusion in the SC list is the social and religious 
disability suffered by a caste on account of untouchability, i.e. being at the pollution end 
of the social hierarchy. Formally, however, any group considered to be eligible for 
inclusion by the President of India (i.e. by an executive order of the Central Government) 
can be included in the list. However, only the Parliament has the power to de-list an SC 
community. 
Included in the SC category are communities from three different religions, 
Hinduism, Sikhism and Buddhism, all having within them communities traditionally 
suffering the odium of untouchability. They together constitute 16 per cent (160 million) 
of the Indian population. 
The term SC has by now become a term of common usage in the public sphere for 
referring to an ex-untouchable community or its member. This administrative 
nomenclature has by now become an established social category and is also a preferred 
term of self-identification for members of these communities themselves. This is 
probably because it has a secular, non-ritual and stigma-free connotation. The other such 
preferred term is dalit, which literally means oppressed (crushed, broken) people. The 
term emerged from the movement of untouchables for social justice and political rights 
led by Dr B.R. Ambedkar and has replaced the old terms (one of them being harijan) 
which sounded ritualistic, having religious connotations. The term dalit is also meant to 
remind everyone about social injustice and discrimination the communities still suffer 
and to inspire the dalits themselves to continue to fight for their social and cultural rights.   41 
 
 
It has by now become a common symbol of political-cultural identity for all ex-
untouchable communities, a singular term for their ethnic identification. 
The policy entitles the SCs to receive three types of benefit. (a) Political 
reservations: Seats in the national Parliament, state-legislatures and local-government 
bodies, reserved in proportion to their size (percentage) in the population. (b) Job 
reservations: Seats are reserved for SCs in all Government and Public Sector jobs, in 
proportion to their size (percentage) in the population. (c) Educational reservations: Seats 
are reserved in educational institutions, especially where there is intense competition for 
entrance. Here also the quantum of reservation is in proportion to their size (percentage) 
in the population. 
(b) Communities of tribal and indigenous people: Specific tribal communities are 
identified and listed in the constitutional schedules and are officially categorized as 
Scheduled Tribes (STs). They receive similar benefits of Reservations as the SCs, i.e. 
seats in legislatures and local government bodies, in government employment and in 
educational institutions. The number of seats reserved for them in each of the three 
sectors is in proportion to their size (per cent) in the population. They constitute about 8 
per cent (80 millions) of Indian population. The implicit principle of inclusion in the 
scheduled category of the tribals (STs) is their physical and cultural isolation, their 
habitat being conventionally in and around hills and forests. Formally, however, like in 
the case of SCs, inclusion in the lists is by executive order and exclusion only through a 
decision of the Parliament. Included in the ST lists are communities from different 
religions: Hinduism, Christianity and Islam as well as a large number of communities 
practising their indigenous tribal faiths.   42 
 
 
Over the years the communities belonging to the category ST have become 
internally highly differentiated, at one end there are the communities living in relative 
conditions suggesting a high degree of physical and cultural isolation and almost totally 
unexposed to literacy and at the other end are those communities, with high literacy rates 
and a significant number of their members being university educated, leading middle and 
upper-class lifestyles. In some states of the North-East they have been the traditional 
ruling elites.
[FN] But taken as a whole the tribal communities have been lagging behind 
the SCs in the extent of benefits they have been able to receive from the educational and 
job reservations.[Ref: Xaxa] 
There has been a permanent, independent commission, to monitor the working of 
social policies relating to SCs and STs, and report their findings, and recommendations 
for improvement of their conditions to the Parliament. 
(c)  Communities of the socially and educationally ‘backward’ people: The 
category Other Backward Classes (OBCs) is the most numerous and heterogeneous of all. 
Obviously, they are in no need of legislative reservations, as they constitute numerical 
majority in many states of India. Over the years their representation in legislatures has 
vastly increased through the normal processes of competitive politics.[FN Data: CSDS, 
Jeffrelot] In India’s representative democracy, political reservation is not their problem. 
In fact it is by converting their numerical strength into political power that the OBCs 
whose entitlement to Reservations was ambiguously articulated in the Constitution, re-
entered the Reservations system after Independence and have managed to stay there.[FN 
on re-entry] The story of reservations for the OBCs is the one of prolonged struggles, 
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even tumultuous. At another level it is an account of democratic politics managing 
inclusion of members of the socially deprived and discriminated majority through 
progressive expansion of affirmative action policies and, thus, preventing the Indian state 
(so far?) from acquiring ethno-majoritarian character. We shall return to this account 
later. At this point it is sufficient to note that it was only in 1991 that an uniform central 
policy was adopted, institutionalising the OBC reservations at the national and state 
levels, when the report of the Second Backward Class Commission (the Mandal Report) 
was accepted by the Central Government for implementation, which was subsequently 
endorsed by the Supreme Court of India.  
The quantum of reservations for the OBCs has since been fixed at 27 per cent at 
the national as well as state levels which is a little over half to their proportion in the 
population. Until 1991 several states did not have any provision of reservations for them. 
The states were: West Bengal, Orissa, Assam, Rajasthan and the territories administered 
by the Central Government (Union Territories). The states in which the provision was 
made the quantum of reservations was arbitrarily fixed at much lower level, i.e. between 
2 to 15 per cent. For entrance in prized educational institutions standards were only 
marginally lowered for them. For example, all the OBC students admitted between 1979-
80 and 1983-84 under the reservation provisions in a medical college in Ahmedabad had 
obtained between 76 and 79 per cent marks at the Std XII examination.[M. Dave] 
The situation, however, has all along been different in the south Indian states, 
where reservations for the other backward classes have existed, in one form or the other, 
containing for over half a century. The extent of reservations there has reached the point 
of saturation, covering almost their proportional strength in the population.   44 
 
 
Unlike the SCs and STs, the communities identified under the OBC category are 
not identified and enumerated in India’s decennial censuses. A community can enter the 
OBC category and receive benefits of Reservation only on the recommendation of the 
statutorily appointed commission. The Second Backward Class Commission listed such 
communities and estimated their population at 52 per cent which seems too liberal on the 
higher side. My estimates of OBCs entitled to receive Reservations benefits, based on 
CSDS sample surveys, is between 38 to 40 per cent.  
The OBCs comprise, by and large, the lower rungs of the Sudras who, in the past, 
suffered from varying degrees of ritual prohibitions applied to the a-dvijas (literally, 
those not ‘twice born) and remain till today socially and occupationally disadvantaged. A 
substantial number of the erstwhile  non-dvijas (Sudras), however, had achieved to a 
considerable extent social mobility and a degree of political and economic advancement, 
in the late medieval period, and especially during the colonial regime. These 
communities, e.g. the Reddies, Kammas, Marathas, Patidars etc. have been kept out of 
the OBC lists. But a vast majority of the Sudras officially included in the OBC category 
belong to communities that have been ritually and socially discriminated and were 
backward. Accordingly, a number of such Sudra communities, along with many such 
other similar Muslim and Christian and Buddhist groups have been included in the lists of 
beneficiaries of the Reservation policy. 
Even so, a few such communities in the southern States, which by the policy’s 
own criteria would not qualify today for Reservations benefits, continue to be on the list 
of beneficiaries. Although their inclusion in the reservation list was justified when the 
scheme was started, their social and educational conditions have since improved to such a   45 
 
 
degree that they can no longer be considered as socially and educationally disadvantaged. 
In the northern and western States, although there are some communities identified by 
sociologists as ‘dominant castes’ and have acquired political clout by virtue of their 
numerical strength, they by and large, they continue to remain backward in social and 
educational terms. In these States (unlike the southern States), reservation for OBCs is of 
recent origin and till yesterday the quantum of reservation for them remained much 
smaller in proportion to their numbers. 
Viewed from the national or the State levels, the OBCs today constitute a far 
more (economically and educationally) heterogeneous category by comparison with the 
SCs and Sts. On the one hand, the OBCs include some of the dominant castes of 
agriculturists who at the local levels are often locked in conflicts with the SCs, both in the 
north and in the south. Some of them have entered, and few more have been forcing their 
entry, in the list of beneficiary communities making use of electoral clout rather than 
their eligibility. Yet, on the other, the category includes a wide array of socially and 
economically deprived groups which suffer at least as much (if not more than) as the SCs 
and STs. These include the so-called ‘criminal’ tribes (stigmatised as such during the 
colonial period), nomadic communities, lower-status and ex-untouchable communities 
converted to Islam, and Christianity from the SCs, as well as a whole range of minor 
castes subjected to a condition of ‘relative untouchablity’ and engaged in caste-bound 
marginal occupations. On the whole the OBC is an open category of ‘inclusion’ to which 
claims of entry could be made by any community, at any time by representing its case to 
the permanent commissions specially set up in the states and at the national level 
specially for this purpose. The commissions are also charged with the responsibility of   46 
 
 
exclusion of those communities from the lists whom it finds, after due investigation, 
being wrongly included or having ceased to be backward. As the category comprises the 
country’s largest section of the electorate this official open-endedness is found politically 
useful by the political parties cultivating vote banks and by the leaders of the majoritarian 
ethno-religious movement (Hindutva) as their potential supporters. All this has resulted in 
intense competition for seeking OBC support in politics, generating trends threatening to 
bring into question the established policy of making India an inclusive society, among 
other things, through affirmative action. Two processes are at work which may decide the 
direction in which the question of inclusion and exclusion may be settled: 
1.  political-ethnicization of castes, i.e. the numerous lower status castes organizing 
themselves into larger ethno-political formations in competitive politics, for 
asserting their rights and maintaining cultural identities, and in the process 
achieve social justice and prevent any distortions of the policy as a part of their 
larger democratic politics; 
2.  political ethno-majoritization of lower-status communities, through their 
cooptation in the Hindutva movement, suppressing ethno-cultural interests and 
identities of communities through their emotional-communal mobilization for 
‘Hindu unity’ and against the non-Hindu minorities. I shall highlight some 
aspects of this politics, in the next section, in the course of examining the 
outcomes and impacts of the affirmative action policy for different groups, and 
generally for the whole system. 
 
 




Performance and Outcomes of the Policy 
Despite tardy and often even dishonest implementation for over fifty years the policy of 
Reservations has worked reasonably well. It in fact can claim some significant 
achievements, not only for the beneficiary groups of SCs, STs and OBCs, but for the 
whole nation. 
First, Reservations have changed the nature and composition of the Indian 
middle-class, making it more inclusive. At Independence, it was a small caste-like social 
formation. Its membership almost entirely consisted of the English-educated, urban 
sections of the dvija castes.[A.R. Desai] Today, thanks to Reservations, members of 
‘lower castes’ have been able to enter the middle-class in significant numbers. A recent 
CSDS study shows that a sizeable section of India’s middle-class consists of the second 
and third generation beneficiaries of Reservations. [Table] 
Second, fifty years ago dalits, tribals and OBCs could aspire only to a limited 
degree of upward mobility and that too as collectivities functioning within the caste 
structure. Today, with Reservations opening for them gates of the middle-class, not only 
the incidence of their upward mobility has increased, but for achieving it they have not to 
depend on ritualistic modes sanctioned by the caste system, such as sanskritization. This 
changed pattern of social mobility—a larger number of individual members of ‘lower 
castes’ acquiring middle-class identity—has deeply shaken the economic and cultural 
roots of the caste system. For, ‘middle-class’ identity is no longer perceived in ritual 
status terms; consumerization rather than sanskritization has become a middle-class 
marker.   48 
 
 
Third, working for over fifty years Reservations have made cumulative and 
lasting impact on India’s political system. With educational and occupational 
opportunities provided by Reservations a new political leadership has emerged from 
among the SCs, STs and OBCs. For example, the very origin and growth of the powerful 
dalit-based party in the north of India, the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) lay in the 
formation of a trade-union like association of the dalit and the backward class 
Government employees. In the course of about five decades of Reservations the entire 
structure of political power in almost all the states and lately at the national level has 
changed. The established pattern of the upper caste English educated elite rule has 
changed. In almost all provincial states of India the OBCs and members of the other 
beneficiary categories of affirmative action are now occupying important power positions 
in Government and, of course, at a relatively much less important levels in the 
bureaucracy. In this process several political parties supported by subaltern groups have 
appeared on the political scene. They bitterly resent and fight reproduction of the 
traditional, caste-hierarchical (jajmani type) client-patron relationship in politics, which 
had for long characterized Indian politics: the vertical political relationship between the 
leadership of the lower-status, rural groups and the English-educated, upper caste elite. 
Leaders of these communities now aggressively assert their interests and identities in the 
electoral arena. Put differently, this new political class, empowered by Reservations, 
worked for ending the upper-caste, elite-oriented Congress monopoly of power. In this 
process, it gave a material basis to its own power in the rural economy. In short, 
Reservations have contributed to changing the old balance of power in the society. 
Viewed from a long-term perspective, the political inclusion of the hitherto excluded   49 
 
 
groups, initiated by the social policy but realized through competitive democratic politics, 
has resulted in disruption of the the reproductive process of caste being periodically 
incarnated into ideologically sanctified power structure that assigned political power to 
hereditary groups. 
Reservations has made a significant impact  for  individuals of the beneficiary 
categories. The most crucial impact is that education has become a social and cultural 
value for the members of all the beneficiary categories. They now see education as an 
accessible means for them to individually attaining modernity and social mobility. Some 
of them having entered the middle class now, unlike their parents, go great lengths to 
educate their children so that they can receive benefits of reservation and are able to stay 
in the growing, competitive Indian middle class. Having entered the middle class not only 
has their lifestyle changed, they now redefine the conventional, caste-like culture of the 
middle class, increasingly in non-ritual status terms. Even for many non-educated, but of 
the aspirant generation, alcoholism is on the wane and savings are increasing. This 
expansion of opportunities has enabled members of these communities to attain, in 
greater numbers than before, high professional stature and positions of power. (Such 
achievements are however rare in business and industry.) As in the case of every other 
upwardly mobile community, this has created an upper crust whose members are 
expected not only to serve as a role model but also provide a protective device, a ‘spear-
head’ for their people to enter the system. 
Successful individuals always had a role model impact, but now with large 
enough number from among these groups having entered the power structure, they have 
been able to install protective mechanisms within the bureaucracy and political parties,   50 
 
 
facilitating entry of their compatriots in the power structure. For example, in Surat 
District of Gujarat, as back as in the sixties about 40% of primary school teachers were 
tribals. This opened up, on a long-term basis, for the tribals of the district the doors of 
political power in Gujarat. In the course of twenty years few of them became not just 
MLAs and MPs (which was mechanically possible through quotas) but Ministers and 
even Chief Ministers of the state. Once they became a critical mass in power, it became 
easy to build other linkages. By using their political influence they acquired a say in 
decision-making, including in recruitment matters expanding the linkages further. Let me 
conclude this part on impact of the policy by reproducing from a field report published in 
a reputed national daily, a day after the Chief Minister of Uttar Pradesh (UP) Ms. 
Mayawati stepped down from power. It aptly illustrates how political power acquired by 
the socially excluded people through affirmative action policy and democratic politics 
can have revolutionary impact for opening up the system.  
In Lucknow and Delhi, politicians may scoff at Mayawati’s Dalit ki beti (daughter 
of a dalit) histrionics, but spend a day in some of these Ambedkar villages—
settlements with more than 50 per cent Dalit populace were declared as such and 
promised special development schemes—and you realise why she, in many a 
home, finds place on a pedestal. 
 
No, she hasn’t transformed hovels into bungalows. Nor has expelled the woes of 
the most wretched. To a first time visitor, there’s little to rejoice: flies crawl over 
half-naked children, debris and dung raise a stink in the lanes and even the pucca 
homes show signs of abject poverty. So what’s new? 
 
Check with the Dalits of these villages. They will tell you this was God’s forsaken 
country. They tilled the land of the upper castes, looked after their animals, 
washed their clothes, shaped their pots, made their shoes and cleaned their mess. 
In turn, they were declared untouchable and unclean—and forced to live in the 
dirtiest quarters of the village. 
 
They cleaned toilets but never dreamed of a toilet of their own. This is why the 
dismal brick homes with “latrines’ that have come up in the last year or two under   51 
 
 
the Indira Awas Yojana means so much to Bisesar and his brethren. And it is not 
just the latrines. 
 
“You want to know how things have changed?” asks Ram Ratan. “When I was 
young, no Dalit could wear a shirt. We didn’t have shoes. We would be beaten up 
if we tried. If we went to town or to a wedding far away, we would take them off 
before we returned to the village.” Today, our children go to school. And they 
have to comb their hair, wear clean clothes, put covers on their books. Those who 
don’t send their children to school look at the others and make sure their children 
too don’t look dirty,” says Babhooti. 
 
That obsession with cleanliness, it’s easy to see why. They had lived so long in 
squalor that it was accepted as unchanging fate. In the Indira Gandhi years came 
the first hint of change. Many schemes were announced but they remained largely 
on paper. 
 
Mayawati, they insist, changed all that. “Badlav ki gati tezi se badh gayi (The 
momentum of change picked up rapidly),” says Ram Rattan. Others nod their 
heads and point to the brick-paved lanes in the village, the tube-wells and hand 
pumps, the Indira Awas homes (for the poorest Below Poverty Line (BPL) 
families) and, of course, the latrines. 
 
They had been promised all this and much more by previous regimes but the work 
started only after Mayawai assumed power for the first time in 1995. But real 
change cannot be measured in brick and steel. It lies in the loss of fear. Now that 
Mayawati is gone, do they fear the return of the old days? “There was a time 
when we were scared to speak out, even look up. Now we go and meet the 
tehsildar, the thanedar and they listen to our complaints.” Everyone concedes that 
there can be no comparison between the old days and the present. 
 
The most visible sign of change is the enthusiasm for education. In the cluster of 
four villages in this area—Abbasganj, Hasanpur, Kaneri, Chatauni—there are four 
primary schools, two junior schools and one high school. Almost every Dalit 
parents send their sons—and daughters—to school. 
 
Outside the Kaneri gram pradhan’s home, a group of women talk of their joys and 
sorrows. They never went to school—there was no school around in their time 
and no one thought of sending them to one. But as Phuljara talks of her wasted 
life, her daughter Kes Kumari comes down the lane after a day in school. We 
meet another bunch of Dalit girls cycling home from a distant high school. And 
14-year-old Kanti in Hasanpur is too busy doing her homework to gaze at passing 
strangers. Education may not give them jobs or make them rich, but Kes Kumari 
and Kanti already exude a sense of hope and a quiet dignity worth more than all 
the diamonds on Mayawati’s ring.  
— The Indian Express, 1.9.2003 
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All this when the policy is far from achieving some crucial physical targets. The 
scheduled quotas still remain unfilled at higher levels of Government jobs. [Table] The 
capacity to receive benefits of the policy, e.g. attainment of minimum educational levels, 
remains abysmally low among several smaller communities comprising the SC, ST and 
OBC categories which has kept them out of the policy’s reach. The other enabling 
measures envisaged to compliment Reservations, remain by and large inadequate. Yet, it 
cannot be denied that Reservations have helped the SCs, STs and the OBCs. By 
providing a concrete basis to their mobility aspirations, it has induced them to achieve 
higher levels of literacy and living standards. For example in the south and west Indian 
states where the policy has been more efficiently implemented, educational and 
occupational profiles of SCs and OBCs have shown much greater improvement. [Table] 
The need to continue and strengthen the policy of affirmative action is greater 
today than ever before. As the economy is freed from the state control, government have 
to see that the weaker and vulnerable sections in the society are not only protected from 
predatory market practices, but that they are enabled to participate in it and derive 
benefits of the expanding economy. No economic reforms can work unless a vast 
majority of a country’s population—who in India go by such names as SCs, STs and 
OBCs—acquire a stake in them. Liberalization does not mean, not even in the most 
liberalized economies of the world, that government cease to rule and surrender the fate 
of the country’s poor and deprived to the ‘market forces’. 
For the market to really become an equalizing force the state has to perform more 
astutely its role of maintaining—and creating where they do not exist—level-playing 
fields. Affirmative action is the most potent instrument for achieving this state. For such a   53 
 
 
policy, to be effective the state has to proactively dispense social justice to those of its 
citizens who still exist on the peripheries of both, the market economy and the civil 
society. Even a minimalist state cannot escape this responsibility. If it does, not just 
economic reforms but its very existence as an ethno-neutral and democratic state may 
come in danger. 
 
New Policy Initiatives: 
It is in this light that there is a need to re-invent the affirmative action policies:  
1.  An exit policy from Reservations for members of those beneficiary communities 
who may be found, after careful investigations, having ceased to be socially and 
educationally backward. This will enable those extremely backward communities 
who are technically entitled to Reservation benefits but do not receive them in 
reality. A lion’s share of such benefits go to a small elite-minority that has 
emerged among them. The exit policy, however, should not apply to dalits, at 
least until their discrimination in public sphere totally ceases and incidence of 
‘atrocity’ on them completely stops. Same will apply to a section of tribals still 
living in conditions of physical isolation. 
2.  Special developmental and promotional measures need to be thought of and 
implemented for reaching directly the poor and ‘backward’ households among the 
upper-caste communities, usually due to their disadvantageous physical locations 
and parental background: rural residence, i.e. residence in small villages poorly 
connected by road or rail and ill served by education and health services; rural-
schooling, parent (mother) uneducated. This developmental and promotional 
measures should not be confused or tied with the Reservations made for the   54 
 
 
socially deprived under affirmative action policies, which are founded on an 
entirely different value premise and rationale. 
3.  The recruitment policy of the corporate (private) sector needs to be modified and 
adapted to the principle of diversity. It is now being increasingly recognized that 
having culturally diverse personnel working at any workplace is not just healthy 
management but, beneficial to the company. The policy of diversity should 
particularly be conceived as special promotional measure for the routinely 
unrepresented cultural groups in business and organized economy, but it should 
not be equated or confused with existing affirmative action policies, which aims 
at, among other things, inclusion of the traditionally and systematically excluded 
groups in the power-structure of the state and its institutions.  2 
 
 
PART I: (Tables 1 to 6) GENERAL TABLES: CONTEXT FOR THE POLICY 
 















% ST Population 
to total 
Population 
1 2  3 4 5  6
  INDIA(*)  1382.23 16.48 677.58 8.08
States: 
1. Andhra  Pradesh  105.92 15.93 41.99  6.31
2. Arunachal  Pradesh  0.04 0.47 5.50  63.66
3. Assam  16.59 7.40 28.74  12.83
4. Bihar  125.72 14.56 66.17  7.66
5. Goa  0.24 2.08 N  0.03
6. Gujarat  30.60 7.41 61.62  14.92
7. Haryana  32.51 19.75 –  0.00
8. Himachal  Pradesh  13.10 25.34 2.18  4.22
9. Karnataka  73.69 16.38 19.16  4.26
10. Kerala  28.87 9.92 3.21  1.10
11. Madhtya  Pradesh  96.27 14.54 153.99  23.27
12. Maharashtra  87.58 11.10 73.18  9.27
13. Manipur  0.37 2.02 6.32  34.41
14. Meghalaya  0.09 0.51 15.18  85.53
15. Mizoram  0.01 0.10 6.54  94.75
16. Nagaland  – 0.00 10.61  87.70
17. Orissa  51.29 16.20 70.32  22.21
18. Punjab  57.43 28.31 –  0.00
19. Rajasthan  76.08 17.29 54.75  12.44
20. Sikkim  0.24 5.93 0.91  22.36
21. Tamil  Nadu  107.12 19.18 5.74  1.03
22. Tripura  4.51 16.36 8.53  30.95
23. Uttar  Pradesh  292.76 21.04 2.88  0.21
24. West  Bengal  160.81 23.52 38.09  5.60
Union Territories 
1. A&N  Islands  – 0.00 0.27  9.54
2. Chandigarh  1.06 16.51 –  0.00
3. D&N  Haveli  0.03 1.97 1.09  78.99
4.  Daman and Diu  0.04 3.83 0.12  11.54
5. Delhi  17.95 19.05 –  0.00
6. Lakshadweep  – 0.00 0.48  93.15
7. Pondicherry  1.31 16.25 –  0.00
N = Negligible.  Lakh = 100,000 
(*) = Excludes Jammu & Kashmir as the 1991 Census was not conducted 
 
Source: Census of India, 1991, Series – 1 Final Population Totals, Paper–1 of 1992, Vol. 1, 




Part I—Table 2:  Some Indicators of Social Development (1991-92 and 1996-97), 
Projections for 2006-7 
 
     1991-92  1996-97 2006-2007
(1) (2)   (3)  (4)  (5) 
Male 57.7  60.10  66.10  1  Life Expectancy (years) 
Female 58.7  61.10  67.10 





3. Death  Rate 
(b) (per thousand)    10.0  8.7  7.4 
4. Birth  Rate 
(b) (per thousand)    28.9  25.72  21.7 
5.  Fertility Rate (per thousand)    130.3  113.0  91.4 
15-35 years  56.0
* 90.0 100.0  6.  Literacy Rate (%) 
7 years and above  52.0  75.0  90.0 
7.   Per Capita Consumption of 
food grains (kg) 
 182.0  193.6  225.0 
(a) Villages without drinking 
water (thousands) 
 3.0
@ 0  0  8. 
(b) Villages partially 
covered (less than 40 lpcd) 
 150.0  negligible  0 
Rural 27
© 50  80  9.  Electricity as a source of 
Lighting (per cent of 
Dwellings 
Urban 75
© 80  95 
 
Notes: 
(a)   Estimate based on SRS Data 
(b)   Based on assumption implicit in the population projections made by the Standing 
Committee of Experts on Population Projection (1989) 
©  Estimate for 1988-89 based on NSS 44
th Round 
@  The figure indicates the number of villages not having any source of drinking water 
by end of March 1992 (Source: Ministry of Rural Development) 
  
lpcd:  Litres per capita per day 
 
* Estimates for 1986-87 based on NSS 42
nd Round 
 
Source:   Eighth Five Year Plan: 1992-1997, Vo.1, P. 29, Planning Commission, Government 







Part I—Table 3:   Sex Ratio, 1901-2001 
 
Census Year  Sex Ratio 














Source:   Provisional Population Totals, Paper—1 of 2001, Series-1, Census of India, 2001 
 
Notes:  1. For 1991, the interpolated figures for Jammu and Kashmir have been used. 
 
  2. While working out the sex ratio for India for the year 2001, the estimated population 
of entire Kuchch district, Morvi, Maliya-Miyana and Wankaner talukas of Rajkot 
district, Jodiya taluka of Jamnagar district of Gujarat and entire Kinnaur district of 
Himachal Pradesh have been used as the population enumeration of Census of 
India, 2001 could not be conducted in these areas due to natural calamities. 
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Part I—Table 4:  Literacy Rate, 1951-2001 
 
 
Census Year  Persons  Males  Females 
1951 18.33 27.16 8.86 
1961 28.30 40.40 15.35 
1971 34.45 45.96 21.97 
1981 43.57 56.38 29.76 
1991 52.21 64.13 39.29 
2001 65.38 75.85 54.16 
 
 
Source:  Provisional Population Totals, Paper—1 of 2001, Series-1, Census of India, 2001. 
 
Note:   Literacy rates for 1951, 1961 and 1971 Census relate to population aged five years and 
above. The rates for the 1981, 1991 and 2001 Census relate to the population aged 









1 1971 1981 1991  Religious 
























Hindus 366.5  83.5  453.4 82.7 549.7 82.6  672.6  82.41
Muslims 46.9  10.7  61.4 11.2 75.6 11.4  95.2  11.67
Christian
s 
10.7 2.4 14.3 2.6 16.2 2.4 18.9  2.32
Sikhs 7.8  1.8  10.4 1.9 13.1 2.0  16.3  1.99
Buddhists 3.2  0.7 3.9 0.7 4.7 0.7 6.3  0.77
Jains 2.0  0.5  2.6 0.5 3.2 0.5  3.4  0.41
Other
2 1.6  0.4  2.2 0.4 2.8 0.4  3.5  0.43




Source:  (i) Census of India, Series I, India, Part II c (i), (ii) Census of India 1981, Series I, 
Paper 3 of 1984 (Religion), (iii) Census of India, Series I, Paper 1 of 1995 (Religion)  
 
Notes:  
1 Excludes Assam and Jammu and Kashmi 
 2  Excludes Mizo district, now constituted of U.T. of Mizoram 
 3 Including unclassified persons 
 
Note: 1981 data do not include Assam   7 
 
 
Part I—Table 6: Comparative Strengths of Scheduled Languages 
Persons who have written the language 
as their mother tongue 




1971 1981 1991  1971  1981
1  1991 
1. Hindi  20,85,14,005  26,45,14,117 33,72,72,114 38.04 38.71  33.85
2. Bengali  4,47,92,312 5,12,98,319 6,95,95,738 8.17 7.51 8.22
3. Telugu  4,47,56,923 5,06,24,611 6,60,17,615 8.16 7.41 7.80
4. Marathi  4,17,65,190 4,94,52,922 6,24,81,681 7.62 7.24 7.38
5. Tamil  3,76,90.106  N.A.
2 5,30,06,368 6.88 N.A.
2 6.26
6. Urdu  2,86,20,895 3,49,41,435 4,34,06,932 5.22 5.11 5.13
7. Gujarati  2,58,65,012 3,30,63,267 4,06,73,814 4.72 4.84 4.81
8. Kannada  2,17,10,649 2,56,97,146 3,27,53,676 3.96 3.76 3.87
9. Malayalam 2,19,38,760 2,57,00,705 3,03,77,176 4.00 3.76 3.59
10. Oriya  1,98,63,198  2,30,21,528 2,80,61,313 3.62 3.37  3.32
11. Punjabi  1,41,08,443  1,96,11,199 2,33,78,744 2.57 2.87  2.76
12. Assamese  89,59,558  N.A.
3 1,30,79,696 1.63 N.A.
3 1.55
13. Sindhi  16,76,875  20,44,389 21,22,848 0.31 0.30  0.25
14. Nepali  14,19,835  13,60,636 20,76,645 0.26 0.20  0.25
15. Konkani  15,08,432  15,70,108 17,60,607 0.28 0.23  0.21
16. Manipuri  7,91,714  9,01,407 12,70,216 0.14 0.13  0.15
17. Kashmiri  24,95,487  31,76,975 N.A.
4 0.46 0.46 N.A.
4
18. Sanskrit  2,212  6,106 49,736 N N  0.01
 
Source:  Census of India, 1971, 1981, 1991. 
 Reproduced  from  India: 2004, pp. 19-20, Ministry of Information, Government of 
India, New Delhi (2004). 
 
Notes:  
1   The percentage of speakers of each language for 1981 have been worked out on the 
total population of India including the estimated population of Assam where the 1981 
Census was not conducted due to disturbed conditions. 
          
2  Full figures for Tamil and Assamese for 1981 are not available as the Census records 
for Tamil Nadu were lost in floods and the 1981 Census could not be conducted in 
Assam due to disturbances then in the State. Therefore, percentage to total population 
for Tamil and Assamese is not given. 
           
3  The percentage of speakers of each language for 1991 has been worked out on the 
total population of India including the projected population for Jammu and Kashmir 
where the 1991 Census could not be conducted due to disturbances. 
            
4  Full figures for Kashmiri language for 1991 are not available as the 1991 Census was 
not conducted in Jammu and Kashmir for reasons explained above. 
 
N.A.   :    Not available 




PART II:   (Tables 1 to 15)  RECORD OF PERFORMANCE OF AFFIRMATIVE 
ACTION POLICY: GOVERNMENT SERVICES, PUBLIC 
SECTOR UNDERTAKINGS, DEFENCE SERVICES, 




Part II—Table 1:  Percent Increase in Dalit/Scheduled Caste (SC) Representation to 
different (higher and lower) Classes/Categories of the Central 
Government Services – From 1971 through 1994 
 
Categories of Services  Year: 













1.1.1971  2.58 4.06 9.59  18.37  N.A. N.A. 
1.1.1974 3.25  4.59  10.33  18.53 13.66  2895359 
1.1.1991  9.09  11.82 15.65 21.24  N.A.  N.A. 
1.1.1994  10.25 12.06 15.73 20.46  15.97  3567112 
 
 
Sources:   Data for 1971, 91 from Eighth Five Year Plan: 1992-97, Vol. 2, p. 419, Government of 
India (Delhi: 1992). 
 
  Data for 1974, 1994 from Ninth Five Year Plan: 1997-2002, Vol. 2, p. 362, 
Government of India (Delhi: 1999). 




Part II—Table 2:  Percent Increase in Tribal/Scheduled Tribes (ST) Representation to 
different (higher & Lower) Classes/Categories of the Central 
Government Services from 1971 through 1994 
 
 
Categories of Services  Year: 













1.1.1971 0.41  0.43  1.70  3.65  N.A.  N.A. 
1.1.1974 0.57  0.49  2.13  3.84  2.81  2895359 
1.1.1991 2.53  2.35  4.89  6.82  N.A.  N.A. 
1.1.1994 2.92  2.81  5.38  6.15  5.48  3567112 
 
 
Sources:   Data for 1971; 91 from Eighth Five Year Plan: 1992-97, Vol. 2, p. 419, Government 
of India (Delhi: 1992). 
 
  Data for 1974, 1994 from Ninth Five Year Plan: 1997-2002, Vol. 2, p. 362, Government 
of India (Delhi: 1999). 




Part II—Table 3:  Representation of SCs and STs in Central Government Services  
  as on 1.1.2000 
 
 
GROUP TOTAL  SC  %  ST  % 
A 88567  9535  10.77  2940  3.32 
B 127148  15424  12.13  3631  2.86 
C 2290323  362799  15.84  145202  6.34 
D 
(Excluding Sweepers)  1002694 183004  18.25  66608  6.64 
Sweepers 130285  74285  57.02  6096  4.68 
Total (Excluding Sweepers)
* 3508732  570762 16.27  218381  6.22 
Total (Including Sweepers)  3639017  645047  17.73  224477  6.17 
 
Note: Information in respect of Department of Revenue is not included. 
 * Sweepers are excluded as their recruitment is unrelated to working of the policy; SCs 
have been traditionally recruited as sweepers by the Government. 
 











Part II—Table 4:   Percent Representation of Brahmins and other Upper Caste Members 
to the elite all-India Services: Indian Administrative Service (IAS), 
Indian Foreign Service (IFS), Indian Police Service (IPS) during the 
period when Reservations Policy did not make an impact: 1947–56 
 
 
Name of the Service  Brahmins  Higher (Dwija Castes:  
non-Sc, non-ST, non-OBC) 
 1947–56  1957–63  1947–56  1957–63 
IAS 34  36  94  81 
IFS 22  22  82  89 
IPS 31  21  81  77 
Other Services  38  29  84  79 
 
 
Source:  V. Subramaniam, ‘Social Background of India’s Administrators’. Reproduced from H. 
Mehta and H. Patel (eds.), Dynamics of Reservations Policy (New Delhi, 1985), p. 99.   12 
 
 
Part II—Table 5: Representation of SC and ST Members to the elite all-India Services 
during the period when the impact of Reservations Policy began to be 







Vacancies filled by 
SC candidates 
% SC in 1991 
population = 14.48 
Vacancies filled by 
ST candidates 
% ST in 1991 
population = 8.08 
IAS 
1994  80  12 (15.0)  6 (7.5) 
1995  80  12 (15.0)  6 (7.5) 
1996  76  12 (15.8)  6 (7.9) 
1997  55   8 (14.5)  4 (7.3) 
1998  55   7 (12.7)  3 (5.5) 
2000  59   9 (15.3)  5 (8.5) 
IFS 
1994  14   2 (14.3)  1 (7.1) 
1995  16   2 (12.5)  1 (6.3) 
1996  14   3 (21.4)  1 (7.1) 
1997  16   3 (18.8)  1 (6.3) 
1998  10   1 (10.0)  1 (10.0) 
2000  18   0   2 (11.1) 
IPS 
1994  98  15 (15.3)  7 (7.1) 
1995  98  15 (15.3)  7 (7.1) 
1996  96  15 (15.6)  8 (8.3) 
1997  84  12 (14.3)  7 (8.3) 
1998  36   2 (5.6)  3 (8.3) 
2000  36   6 (16.7)  4 (11.1) 
 





Part II—Table 6:   Percentage of Scheduled Caste/Scheduled Tribe Representation in 
Public Sector Undertakings: 1971 to 1984 
 
 
Scheduled Castes  Scheduled Tribes  Category 
1971 1989 1971 1989 
Class I  (Group A)  0.52  5.76  0.17  1.29 
Class II (Group B)  1.54  8.41  0.16  2.31 
All categories  8.17  20.36  2.24  9.68 
 
(Separately for CI.III & IVB not available) 
 






Part II—Table 7:   Representation of SCs & STs in different job categories in Central 
Public Enterprises (PSUs) as on 1.1.2002 
 
 
Job Category  Total No. of 
Employees 
SCs No.  Percentage  STs No.  Percentage
High Level   :  Group ‘A’    1,95,027     21,848  11.20     6,545    3.36 
Middle Level: Group ‘B’    1,89,089     22,707  12.00     9,275    4.90 
Lower Level:  Group ‘C’    8,89,379  1,69,401  19.04    78,271    8.80 
Lowest Level: Group ‘D’ 
(Excluding Sweepers) 
  3,63,267     78,721  21.67    39,457  10.85 
Total 16,36,762  2,92,667  17.88  1,33,548    8.16 
 
 
Note:   Sweepers have been excluded from this category as these jobs are traditionally held 
by the SCs and as such it does not reflect on the working of the policy. 
 
Source: Department of Public Enterprises, official web: http://www.dpe.nic.in/anrch5.htm 
 
   14 
 
 
Part II—Table 8:  Table Showing Castewise Representation in Managerial Cadre (non-
Government Sector)—1971  
 
Caste  Percentage in the cadre of manager 
Brahmins 41.4 
Business castes: Bania, Arora, etc.  43.2 
Cultivators: Jat, Patels, etc.  24.3 
Other low castes (OBCs)   0.8 
Untouchables (SC)  0.4 
 
Note:  The principle of affirmative action is not practised in any form in the private/corporate 
sector in India. The debate initiated recently by some civil society groups on the issue of 
‘equal opportunity’ and ‘diversity’ in recruitment has not found any resonance in the 
corporate sector. 
 
Source: Jain Sagar C., Indian Manager: His social origin and career, 1971. Reproduced 
from H. Mehta and H. Patel (eds.), Dynamics of Reservations Policy (New Delhi, 
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Part II—Table 9: Representation of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in the Defence 
Services 
 
Presence of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in the Army in the years-1990, 1995 and 
2000. 
 
Year Total  Strength  SC  Percentage  ST  Percentage 
1990 10,01,523  85494  8.53  23405  2.34 
1995 9,14,970  66213  7.3  16538  1.80 
2000 10,78,281  77841  7.21  25750  2.38 
 
Source:  17
th Report of the Committee on the Welfare of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes 
(2001-2002), Thirteenth Lok Sabha, Ministry of Defence. 
 






Part II—Table 10: Details of regiments that are composed wholly or partly by specified 
SC/ST  
Regiment/Battalion Class  Composition  Percentage 
Bengal Engineering Group  Other Hill Tribes (Less Garhwali and Kumaoni    05 
Bombay Engineering Group  Sikh (M and R)    37 
Adivasi    50  Bihar 
SC    25 
Mahar  Mahar    80 
Sikh (M and R)    25  Para 
Adivasi    05 
Sikh Light Infantry  Sikh (M and R)  100 
Assam  Tribes from North East States    85 
Naga    50  Naga 
Other Hill Tribes    50 
Guards Hill  Tribes  100 
 
Source:  17
th Report of the Committee on the Welfare of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes 
(2001-2002), Thirteenth Lok Sabha, Ministry of Defence. 
 
Note:  A regiment with a group name need not have all the officers or cadres belonging to the 
same group.  




Part II—Table 11: Number of Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe Personnel in the 
Indian Army as of 31
st Dec 1999 
 
Scheduled Castes  Scheduled Tribes 
Officers Others  Total Officers  Others  Total 
82 70330  70412 34 25913  25947 
 
Source:   17
th Report of the Committee on the Welfare of Scheduled Castes and 








Part II—Table 12: Designationwise Position of SC/ST Teachers in University Teaching 
Departments/University Colleges (1992-93) 
 
 
Designation Total  SC  Percentage  ST  Percentage 
Professor  3338 32 0.96 11 0.33 
Reader  5837  104  1.78 31 0.53 
Lecturer  10191  328  3.22 81 0.79 
 
Source:  UGC, ‘Representation of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in Enrolment, 
Teaching and Non-Teaching Staff in University Teaching epartments/University 
Colleges’, p. 55. Reproduced from Virginius Xaxa, “Protective Discrimination: Why 
Scheduled Tribes Lag Behing Scheduled Castes”, Economic and Political Weekly, July 





Table 13: The OBCs (and SC/ST) in the Central Government Services: 1989* 
 
Class I  Class II  Class III & IV  All Classes  Depts/Bodies 
Total SC/ST  OBC  Total SC/ST OBC Total SC/ST  OBC Total  SC/ST  OBC 




























2.  Autonomous Bodies/ 























































































*Figures in parenthesis represent percentages 
 
Source: Report of the Backward Classes (Mandal) Commission, 1980, Vol. II, p. 92. 














A     82129     988   1.2      432  0.53 
B   107622     632  0.59      263  0.24 
C 2313481  17975 0.78     8834 0.38 
D  1102262   9460  0.86    3833  0.35 
TOTAL  3605494  29055 0.81 13362 0.37 
 
Note:   Reservations for OBCs in Central Government jobs came into force for the first 
time by the Government order providing for 27% reservations in only 1991. 
However, OBC representation in the provincial states services has been there since 
many states has reached allocated proportions. 
 





Part II--Table 15: Amenities Available to Dalits (Percentages) 
 
 
All Dalits  Amenities 
Rural Urban  Rural Urban 
Safe Drinking Water  55.5  81.4  59.84  80.59 
Electricity 30.5  75.8  21.84  56.32 
Toilet 9.3  65.5  5.15  38.28 
Safe Water, Electricity and Toilet  3.9  50.5  3.35  32.34 
None of the above facilities  31.3  5.4  32.14  9.62 
 
 
Source:  Census of India 1991 for columns 2 and 3; Advocacy Update: National Centre for 








PART III: (Tables 1 to 9) IMPACT ON EDUCATION 
 
 
Part III—Table 1:  Literacy Rates for Scheduled Caste/Scheduled Tribe Population  
by Sex-1991 
 
Scheduled Caste  Scheduled Tribe 
State/Union Territory 
Person  Male  Female  Person  Male  Female 
  INDIA*  37.41  49.91  23.76  29.60  40.65  18.19 
1.  Andhra Pradesh  31.59  41.88  20.92  17.16  25.25  8.68 
2.  Arunachal Pradesh  57.27  66.25  41.42  34.45  44.00  24.94 
3.  Assam  53.94  63.88  42.99  49.16  58.93  38.98 
4.  Bihar  19.49  30.64  7.07  26.78  38.40  14.75 
5.  Delhi  57.60  68.44  43.82  —  —  — 
6.  Goa  58.73  69.55  47.51  42.91  54.43  29.01 
7.  Gujarat  61.07  75.47  45.54  36.45  48.25  24.20 
8.  Haryana  39.22  52.06  24.15  —  —  — 
9.  Himachal Pradesh  53.20  64.98  41.02  47.09  62.74  31.18 
10.  Karnataka  38.06  49.69  25.95  36.01  47.95  23.57 
11.  Kerala  79.66  85.22  74.31  57.22  63.38  51.07 
12.  Madhya Pradesh  35.08  50.51  18.11  21.54  32.16  10.73 
13.  Maharashtra  56.46  70.45  41.59  36.79  49.09  24.03 
14.  Manipur  56.44  65.28  47.41  53.63  62.39  44.48 
15.  Meghalaya  44.27  54.56  31.19  46.71  49.78  43.63 
16.  Mizoram  77.92  77.54  81.25  82.73  86.67  78.74 
17.  Nagaland  —  —  —  60.59  66.27  54.51 
18.  Orissa  36.78  52.42  20.74  22.31  34.44  10.21 
19.  Punjab  41.09  49.82  31.03  —  —  — 
20.  Rajasthan  26.29  42.38  8.31  19.44  33.29  4.42 
21.  Sikkim  51.03  58.69  42.77  59.01  66.80  50.37 
22.  Tamil Nadu  46.74  58.36  34.89  27.89  35.25  20.23 
23.  Triupura  56.66  67.25  45.45  40.37  52.88  27.34 
24.  Uttar Pradesh  26.85  40.80  10.69  35.70  49.95  19.86 
25.  West Bengal  42.21  54.55  28.87  27.78  40.07  14.98 
Union Territories 
1.  Andaman and Nicobar 
Islands  —  —  —  56.62  64.16  48.74 
2.  Chandigarh  55.44  64.74  43.54  —  —  — 
3.  Dadra and Nagar Haveli  77.64  88.03  66.61  28.21  40.75  15.94 
4.  Daman and Diu  79.18  91.85  67.62  52.91  63.58  41.49 
5.  Lakshadweep  —  —  —  80.58  89.50  71.72 
6.  Pondicherry  56.26  66.10  46.28  —  —  — 
 
*Excludes Jammu and Kashmir. 
Source: Registrar General of India, Decennial Census 1991, Series 1 Paper 1 of 1993, Primary 
Census Abstract for SC and ST. Reports. 















SCs  Male Female Total 





1961  10.27  16.96 3.29  8.53  13.83 3.16 28.31  40.40  15.34 24.02 
 
1971  14.67  22.36 6.44 11.30  17.63 4.85 34.45  45.95  21.97 29.46 
    (42.84%)  (31.83%) (95.75%) (32.47%)  (27.48%) (53.48%) (21.69%)  (13.74%)  (43.22%)   
 
1981  21.38 31.12  10.93  16.35 24.52  8.04  43.56 56.37 29.75  43.67 
    (45.74%)  (39.18%) (69.72%) (44.69%)  (39.08%) (65.77%) (26.44%)  (22.67%)  (35.41%)   
 
1991  37.41 49.91  23.76  29.60 40.65  18.19  52.21 64.13 39.29  52.21 
    (74.98%) (60.38%) (117.38%) (81.04%) (65.78%) (126.24%) (19.86%) (13.77%) (32.07%)   
 
Source:  Census of India 1961-91 and National Literacy Mission: Literacy Scenario in India, Government of India 





Part III—Table 3: Literacy Rates of SCs and STs—The Gains and the Gaps 
 
 
Category 1971  1981  1991
*  % Increase of 
1991 over 1971 
General Population including SC/ST)  29.45  36.23  52.21  77.28 
Scheduled Castes  14.67  21.38  37.41  155.01 
Scheduled Tribes  11.30  16.35  29.60  161.95 
Gap between SCs and the General Populations  14.78  14.85  14.80     0.14 
Gap between STs and the General Population  18.15  19.88  22.61   24.57 
 
*Excludes 0-6 age group 
 
Source:  Educational Development of SCs and STs, Department of Education, 1995. 







Part III—Table 4: Female Literacy Rates of SCs, STs and General Population 
 
Category 1971  1981 1991
*
Female Literacy Rates 
All Communities including SC/ST  21.97  29.85 39.29
Scheduled Castes  6.44  10.93 23.76
Scheduled Tribes  4.85  8.04 18.19
GAP 
Gap between female literacy rate of SCs and of All communities  15.53  18.92 15.53
Gap between female literacy rate of STs and of All communities  17.12  21.81 21.10
 
*Excludes 0-6 age group 
 
Source:  Educational Development of SCs and STs, Department of Education, 1995. 
Reproduced from Ninth Plan: 1999-2002, p. 358. 






Part III—Table 5: Gross Enrolment Ratios of SCs & STs and General Population 
 
 
Level/Years  General Population  Scheduled Castes  Scheduled Tribes 
























































Pace of Progress             
I-V  (Primary  level)  18.7 29.2 23.8 22.2 37.3 29.7 35.8 49.0 43.0
VI-III  (Middle  level) 25.2 26.3 25.7 33.5 30.6 32.2 33.4 26.8 30.5
 
Source: Selected Education Statistics, 1995-96, Department of Education, New Delhi. 
 
Reproduced from Ninth Plan 1997-2002, p. 359. 
 






Part III—Table 6: Drop-out Rates amongst SCs and STs at various stages of Education 
 
Category  Classes I-V  Classes I-VIII  Classes I-X 
  1980-81 1989-90 1980-81 1990-91 1980-81  199-91 
General  58.70 48.08 72.70 63.40 82.46 71.34 
SC  60.16 49.03 76.84 72.09 86.91 80.58 
ST  75.66 63.81 86.71 80.10 91.18 86.00 
 
Source: Educational Development of SCs and STs (1995) and Unpublished Data of the 
Department of Education. 
 
Note:  1. Since the latest data on the drop-out rates of SCs and Sts is available only for 1990-91, 
data for General Population was also used for the same year for effective comparison. 
 
2.  Figures for 1990-91 in respect of SCs and STs are not available for primary level. 
 







Table 7: Enrolment by Stages of Dalit Children, 1994–95 (in millions) 
 
 
Dalits Tribals  Others  Stages 
Boys Girls Total Boys Girls Total Boys  Girls Total
Primary 1.00  0.75  1.80 0.54 0.36 0.90 6.20  4.70  10.90
Middle  0.35  0.21 0.56 0.15 0.08 0.23 2.50 1.50 4.00
Secondary  0.20  0.08 0.29 0.07 0.04 0.11 1.60 0.08 2.40
Hr. Education  0.031  0.01  0.042 0.01 0.004 0.01 0.31 0.16 0.47
 
 
Source: Report of the Ministry of Human Resource Development, 1995 
 
Reproduced from Advocacy Update, January-March, No. 15, p. 5, published by National Centre 
for Advocacy Studies, Pune, India.  




Table 8:  Percent SC and ST Students Enrolled in Different Faculties of  
  Higher Education in 1992-1993 
 
Faculty  SC  ST  SC and ST 
Arts 8.0  3.9  11.9 
Science  5.8 2.1 7.9 
Engg./Tech 8.1  2.1  10.2 
Medicine  11.9 4.4 16.3 
Agriculture  10.7 5.4 16.1 
Law  11.7 2.7 14.4 
 
Note: Enrolment facultywise includes levels ranging from undergraduate to research plus 
diploma/certificate course. 
 
Source:  UGC, ‘Representation of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in Enrolment, 
Teaching and Non-Teaching Staff/University Colleges’, p. 5. 
 
Reproduced from Verginius Xaxa, “Protective Discrimination: Why Scheduled Tribes Lag 





Table 9: Admission of Scheduled Caste/Tribe Students in IIT-Kanpur (1967-78) 
 
No. of Candidates 
Applied for JEE 
No. of Candidates in 
Merit and Called for 
Interview 
No. of Candidates 
Offered 
Admissions 
No. of Candidates Actually 
Admitted 
Year 
Total  SC  ST SC  ST SC ST SC ST  Total 
1967-68  62  47  15  -  - - - - - - 
1968-69  47 -  - 2  - - - - - - 
1969-79  35  29  6 7  1 7 1 7 1 3 
1970-71  28 -  - 6  1 6 1 6 1 7 
1971-72  35 -  - 1  - 1 - 1 - 1 
1972-73  79 -  - 1  - 1 - 1 - 1 
1973-74  98 86  12  42  6 42 6  -  - 46 
 
Source:  K.N. Sharma, et. al. (1974): ‘Educational Arithmetic of Social Inequality’, A Study of 
Admission and Adjustment of IIT, Kanpur Students (Mimeographed). 
 








Part IV—Table 1: Total and SC, ST Job Seekers (Unemployed) from 1995 to 2000 as 
shown on the Live Register of Employment Exchange (In Thousand) 
 
Scheduled Castes  Scheduled Tribes  Year 
Number Percentage  Number  Percentage
Total Number 
1995 5095.0 13.9  1409.4 3.8  36742.2 
1996 5208.9 13.9  1467.3 3.9  37429.6 
1997 5626.0 14.4  1586.7 4.1  39139.9 
1998 5799.4 14.5  1694.6 4.2  40089.6 
1999 5948.0 14.7  1762.4 4.4  40371.4 
2000 6135.3 14.8  1860.1 4.5  41343.6 
 
Source: “Employment Exchange Statistics”, Directorate General of Employment and Training, 





Part IV—Table 2: Total and SC, ST Educated Job Seekers (Unemployed) from 1995 to 








Number Percentage  Number  Percentage 
Total Educated 
Unemployed 
1996  3134.4  12.4    876.1  3.4  25265.3 
1997  3539.7  13.0    958.1  3.5  27282.0 
1998 3858.5  13.9  1005.4  3.6  27788.9 
1999 3961.6  13.8  1209.7  4.2  28660.3 
2000 4068.6  13.8  1455.3  4.9  29548.8 
 
 
Note:   Definition of Educated – a job seeker who is having qualification of the level of 
Matriculation and above. 
 
Source: “Employment Exchange Statistics”, Directorate General of Employment and Training, 
Ministry of Labour, Government of India, New Delhi. 
 








Part V—Table 1:   Percentage of Population Living Below Poverty Line 
 
 
Category 1984-84  1993-94  Percentage 
Decrease 
General  44.48 35.97 (-)   8.51 
SCs  57.60 48.37 (-)   9.23
STs 63.14 51.14 (-)  12.00
 
 
Source:   Perspective Planning Division, Planning Commission, New Delhi 
 
Note:  The aggregate poverty ratio of SC and ST population 1983-84 has been worked out as a 
weighted average of rural and urban poverty ratio using 1981 Census population of the 
respective Groups in rural and urban areas as weights. In a similar way, 1991 Census 
population is used to obtain aggregate poverty ratio for these two groups in 1993-94 
  
  Reproduced from Ninth Five Year Plan, 1997-2002, Planning Commission, Government 
of India (p. 361).   27 
 
 
[Part V- Tables 2 to 9: The following section presents tables showing extent of poverty 
reduction among Dalits (SCs) and Tribals (STs), using three poverty measures, between 1993-94 
and 1999-2000 as well as the findings based on these and other data (not presented here). The 
tables and findings at the end of the tables are excerpted from K. Sundaram and Suresh D. 
Tendulkar, “Poverty among Social and Economic Groups”, Economic and Political Weekly, 
December 13, 2003, pp. 5263-76.] 
 
 
Part V—Table 2:   Composition of Total and Poor Population Located in Households 
Classified by Social–Group Affiliation: All India Rural 1993–94— 
  1999–2000 
1993–94 1999–2000 














Scheduled castes  21.10  28.19  45.69  20.43  27.10  38.38 
Scheduled tribes  10.83  15.46  48.81  10.49  17.41  48.02 
Others 68.07  56.35  28.30  69.08  55.49  23.23 









* Notes:  HCR: (Head Count Ratio) is the commonly used measure of poverty estimating size 
(proportion) of poor in a population. 
 
Part V—Table 3:  Composition of Total and Poor Population Located in Households 


















Scheduled castes  13.85  22.48  42.85  14.38  23.57  37.84 
Scheduled tribes    3.21   4.09  33.63    3.40    5.18  35.15 
Others 82.94  73.43  23.39  82.22  71.26  20.01 









* Notes:  HCR: (Head Count Ratio) is the commonly used measure of poverty estimating size 






Part V—Table 4:  Poverty Measures for Population Located in Households Classified by Social Groups, 
All–India: Rural: 1993–94—1999–2000 
 
 
1993–94 1999–2000   
Category  HCR 
(Per Cent) 
No. of Poor 
(000) 
PGI FGT  HCR 
(Per Cent) 





Scheduled  castes  45.69  63,558 0.10369  0.033435 38.38  57,036  0.07920  0.02407 
Scheduled  tribes  48.81  34,883 0.11780  0.044072 48.02  36,651  0.11451  0.03842 
Others 28.30  126,941  0.05603  0.01692  23.23  116,762  0.04298  0.01211 
OBCs in others)  (NA)  (NA)  (NA)  (NA)  (29.04)  (66,369)  (0.05475)  (0.01560) 
 
Note:  
*PGI (Poverty Gap Index), is constructed and used as indicator of the depth of poverty. 
 
+ FGT (Square Poverty Gap) is constructed and used as a measure reflecting severity of poverty. For 







Part V—Table 5:  Poverty Measures for Population Located in Households Classified by Social Groups, 
All–India: Urban: 1993–94—1999–2000 
 
 




No. of Poor 
(000) 
PGI FGT  HCR 
(Per Cent) 
No. of Poor 
(000) 
PGI FGT 
Scheduled castes  42.85  13,956  0.10778  0.03876  37.84  15,041  0.08766  0.02894 
Scheduled  tribes  33.63  2,537 0.08353  0.02975 35.15  3,304  0.08980  0.03350 
Others 23.39  45,580  0.05110  0.01673  20.01  45,482  0.04209  0.01298 
 
Note:  
*PGI (Poverty Gap Index), is constructed and used as indicator of the depth of poverty. 
 
+ FGT (Square Poverty Gap) is constructed and used as a measure reflecting severity of poverty. For 
detailed explication and discussion of the measures see Sundaram and Tendulkar, cited at the beginning 
of these tables.    
 
 
Part V—Table 6:   Percentage Change (1993-94 and 1999-2000) in Poverty Indicators 
by Socio-Economic Categories of All-India Rural Population 
 
Socio-Economic Category  HCR  PGI  FGT
* 
Scheduled castes 
1.  Self-employed agricultural  -14.80  -25.97  -35.09 
2.  Self-employed non-agricultural    -7.95  -11.78  -16.72 
3.  Agricultural labour  -18.98  -27.50  -34.04 
4.   Other labour  -14.40  -5.89   -3.20 
5.  Others  -31.93  -44.90  -50.68 
All scheduled castes  -16.00  -23.62  -29.93 
Scheduled tribes 
1.  Self-employed agricultural    -7.69  -10.95  -15.48 
2.  Self-employed non-agricultural  -10.80  -12.62  -21.92 
3.  Agricultural labour     1.98     0.94    -1.56 
4.  Other labour    -4.39    -6.73  -11.66 
5.  Others  -30.49  -30.74  -22.72 
All scheduled tribes    -1.62    -2.79    -5.64 
Others 
1.  Self-employed agricultural  -19.78  -26.13  -32.37 
2.  Self-employed non-agricultural  -20.74  -22.85  -28.97 
3.  Agricultural labour  -18.26  -26.43  -32.41 
4.  Other labour  -29.38  -27.86  -30.45 
5.  Others  -26.20  -35.29  -36.91 
Social groups others  -17.92  -23.29  -28.42 
MoL category, all social groups 
MoL category, all social groups  -17.10  -22.98  -28.77 
Self-employed agricultural  -17.44  -20.01  -26.25 
Agricultural labour  -15.73  -22.66  -28.00 
Other labour  -22.42  -19.54  -20.92 
Others -31.17  -40.49  -42.33 
All households  -15.38  -20.47  -25.43 
    
 
Part V—Table 7:   Percentage Change (1993-94—1999-2000) in Poverty Indicators  
  by Socio-Economic Categories of All-India Urban Population 
 
Socio-Economic Category  HCR PGI FGT 
Scheduled castes 
Self-employed    -2.50  -11.99  -15.83 
Wage/salaried  earner  -33.16 -37.75 -46.09 
Casual labour    -9.23  -16.96  -23.83 
Others  -11.14 -32.80 -48.46 
All scheduled castes  -11.69  -13.67  -25.34 
Scheduled tribes 
Self-employed    -6.95   -9.51    -9.15 
Wage/salary earner    -8.65   -6.46     6.81 
Casual labour  12.38    7.67    -0.60 
Others   -3.22  47.25  158.53 
All scheduled tribes   4.52    7.51    12.61 
Others 
Self-employed  -10.30 -12.52 -18.91 
Wage/salary  earner  -26.86 -28.55 -35.21 
Casual  labour  -16.84 -20.94 -23.86 
Others  -22.71 -31.23 -42.50 
Social groups others  -14.45  -17.63  -22.41 
MoL category, all social groups 
Self-employed    -8.39  -12.94  -17.36 
Wage/salary  earner  -27.27 -29.43 -35.33 
Casual  labour  -12.75 -17.94 -22.18 
Others  -19.95 -28.89 -38.94 
All  households  -12.57 -16.00 -20.79 
    
 
Part V—Table 8:   Percentage Change between 1994 and 2000 in Total Population,  
  Poor Population and Other Poverty Indicators: All–India Rural  
  Population Located in Households Classified by Social Groups  
  (Percentage Change between 1993–94 and 1999–2000) 
 




HCR PGI FGT 
Social Groups 
Scheduled castes    6.83  –10.26  –16.07  –23.62  –29.93
Scheduled tribes    6.99     5.06    –1.68    –2.79    –5.65
Others  12.05    –7.98  –17.92  –23.29  –28.43








Part V—Table 9:   Percentage Change between 1994 and 2000 in Total Population,  
  Poor Population and Other Poverty Indicators: All–India Urban  
  Population by Household Type and Social Group 
  (Percentage Change between 1993–94 and 1999–2000)  
 




HCR PGI FGT 
Social Groups 
Scheduled castes  22.12    7.77  –11.69  –18.67  –25.34
Scheduled tribes  24.59  30.23    4.52     7.51    12.61
Others 16.62    –0.22  –14.45  –17.63  –22.41
All households  17.64    2.85  –12.57  –16.00  –20.79
 





Among the social groups, the scheduled castes and scheduled tribes population report levels of poverty 
well above average on all three indicators of prevalence, depth and severity of poverty in both years 
and in both rural and urban areas of the country. The other backward castes too suffer from above 
average levels of poverty, which are, nevertheless, much lower than the poverty levels among the SC 
and the ST population. 
 
The double disadvantage, of being an assetless casual wage labour household in the socially 
disadvantaged social groups of the scheduled castes or the scheduled tribes, accentuates the 
prevalence, depth and severity of poverty. Thus, agricultural labour households in the ST population 
have the highest headcount ratio (close to or above 60 per cent) in both years studied in rural India. 
Similarly, casual labour households in the SC population in 1993-94 and in the ST population in 1999-
2000 reported the highest HCR of 64 per cent in urban India. 
 
Given rural and urban poverty lines, rural poverty rates are, in general, higher than their comparable 
urban counterparts. Exceptions to this pattern are provided by casual labour households in all the social 
groups and by the self-employed among scheduled castes and in the (residual non-SC/ST) social group 
of others. 
 
In terms of the rates of reduction of poverty indicators between 1993-94 and 1999-2000, among social 
groups, they were the lowest for the scheduled tribe population in rural India. In urban India however, 
this social group experienced a rise in all three poverty indicators. Our more disaggregated analysis by 
MoL categories, within each social group, helped us pinpoint the rise in poverty in the assetless 
(casual) wage-labour dependent households among the scheduled tribe population as the principal 
factor underlying a clearly worse-than-average performance in terms of poverty-reduction. It therefore 
also indicated a clear worsening of the relative poverty situation of the scheduled tribe population in 
rural India, and even more so, in urban India. 
 
In contrast to the ST population, scheduled caste households generally matched or even bettered the 
average rural/urban household in terms of percentage reduction in all three poverty indicators between 
1993-94 and 1999-2000. In a large measure, this was facilitated by a better-than-average performance 
of agricultural labour households among them in rural India, and of the regular wage/salary earner 
households in the groups in urban India. (K. Sundaram & S. Tendulkar) 
    
 
 
PART VI: (Table 1 to 10)  CRIME AND VIOLENCE (ATROCITIES)  




Part VI—Table 1: Crimes Against SCs and STs during 1994 to 1996 
 




Crimes Against Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes 
   SCs STs  Total 







(1) (2)  (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)  (8)





















Source:  The Crime in India: 1994 and 1995; 1996: Provisional National Crime Records Bureau, 
Govt. of India, New Delhi. 
 
(Prov.):   Provisional 
 
S.L:  Refers to crimes registered under the Special Laws (SL), viz. PCR (Protection of Civil 
Rights) Act, 1955 and the SC and ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 
 
* Figures in parenthesis (Co.4, 6 and 8) indicate the percentage of total crime against SCs and STs in 
the total number of crimes in India (Col.2). 
 




Part VI—Table 2:   Atrocities against Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes  
 
Crime-Wise Classification of the number of atrocity cases during 1990, 1991 and 1992 
 
Number of cases reported during 
1990 1991 1992 
Type of cases 
SC  ST Total SC ST Total SC ST Total
Murder  584  124 708 610 146 756 693 118 811
Grievous  Hurt  1691 259 1950 1706 320 2026 1619 232 1851
Rape  885 339 1224 784 334 1118 835 383 1218






2797 16705 13994 3908 17852 14574
 
2915 17489
Total  17667 3578 21245 17646 4778 22424 18340 3709 22049
 
Source:   Official Website of the Ministry of Human Resource Development, Government of India at 




Part VI—Table 3: Crime and Violence Against Dalits, 1993–95 
 
 
No. Crime–heads  1993 1994 1995
1 Murder  510 546 571
2 Dacoity  102 78 70
3 Robbery  197 258 218
4 Arson  369 533 500
5  Kidnapping and 
Abduction 
246 251 276
6 Rape  798 992 873
7  Violation of PCR Act
*  2,531 1,731 1,528
8 Hurt/Injuiries  – 4,542 4,544
9  Violation of SC/ST 
Atrocities Act 1989 
– 14,938 13,925
10 Others  20,220 10,038 10,492
  Total 24,973 33,908 32,997
 
*PCR: Protection of Civil Rights Act of 1955. 
 
Source: Government of India: 1997, Crime in India 1995, National Crime Records Bureau, Ministry 
of Home Affairs, p. 260.   
 
 
Part VI—Table 4 
 
Cases registered with the police of crimes and atrocities against Dalits: 1996, 1997 
 
Nature of crime   1996 1997 Total
Murder 543 503 1617
Injuries 4585 3462 12591
Rape 949 1002 2824
Kidnaping and Abduction  281 242 799
Robbery 213 157 588
Arson 464 384 1348
Other Offences  13278 11693 35463
Total 20313 17443 55230
 
Source : ‘Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and all Forms of Discrimination’,   
Written Statement submitted by the Robert F Kennedy Memorial to the Commission on Human 
Rights, Economic and Social Council, United Nations 
    
 
Part VI—Table 5:   State-wise Incidence of Crime and Violence against Dalits (SCs): 1989 
 
State/Union Territories 
Andhra Pradesh        465  (Barring October) 
Arunachal Pradesh            –   
Assam         17   
Bihar       997  (till November 1989) 
Goa          2   
Gujarat      593   
Haryana        77   
Himachal Pradesh        70  (till Barring June) 
Jammu & Kashmir      155   
Karnataka       490  (till August 1989) 
Kerala       456  (till September 1989) 
Madhtya Pradesh     3878  (till November 1989) 
Maharashtra       329  (till November 1989) 
Manipur          –   
Meghalaya          –   
Mizoram          –   
Nagaland          –   
Orissa       318  (till November 1989) 
Punjab         21   
Rajasthan    1588   
Sikkim          3   
Tamil Nadu      409  (till October 1989) 
Uttar Pradesh    3945  (till September 1989) 
West Bengal        12   
Andaman & Nicobar Islands          –   
Chandigarh          –   
Dadra & Nagar Haveli          –   
Delhi          5   
Goa, Daman & Diu          –   
Lakshadweep          –   
Pondicherry          1   
Total:  13031  
 
Source: Home Ministry Report, 1989-90. Reproduced from Mohandas Nemishrai (ed.), Lokayan 
Bulletin, No. 4 (Special Number), Delhi: 1989-90.   
 
 
Part VI—Table 6:   State-wise number of atrocities reported against SC and STs during 1992 
 
Number of cases of atrocities  State/Union Territory 
SC ST  Total 
Andhra Pradesh  724  123  847 
Bihar 926  5  931 
Goa 3  -  3 
Gujarat 1560  304  1864 
Haryana 86  -  86 
Himachal Pradesh  39  -  39 
Jammu and Kashmir  25  -  25 
Karnataka 720  27  747 
Kerala 703  157  860 
Madhya Pradesh  4571  1957  6528 
Maharashtra 751  331  1082 
Manipur -  1  1 
Orissa 383  129  512 
Punjab 18  -  18 
Rajasthan 2204  636  2840 
Sikkim 21  20  41 
Tamil Nadu  677  -  677 
Uttar Pradesh  4891  -  4891 
West Bengal  15  14  29 
Chandigarh 20  -  20 
Dadra & Nagar Haveli  -  5  5 
Delhi 2  -  2 
Pondicherry 1  1  1 
Total 18340  3709  22049 
 
Source: Official Website of the Ministry of Human Resource Development, Government of India at 




PART VI—Table 7: Atrocities against Scheduled Castes:1984-1995 
 
 
  1984 1989-90 1995 
Uttar Pradesh  4,200  1,067  14,966 
Madhya Pradesh  5,537  5,592   2,717 
Rajasthan 1,648  1,501    5,204 
Bihar  1,845    434  NA 
Gujarat    582    710  NA 
Tamil Nadu    689    334  NA 
Maharashtra    570    426  NA 
 
Sources:  For 1984, V. Tatu, Politics of Ethnic Nepotism, New Delhi: Sterling Publishers United, 1991, 
p. 131; for 1989-90, Lok Sabha Debates, Vol. 8, No. 2, 8 August 1990, pp. 622-30; and for 
1995, H. Hanumanthappa, ‘Dalits in India: A Status Report’, Dalit-International Newsletter, 
Vol. 2, No. 2, June 1997, p. 9. 
 
  Reproduced from Christophe Jaffrelot, India’s Silent Revolution: The Rise of Lower Castes 
in India (London: 2003).   
 
 
Part VI—Table 8: Ranking of states in terms of incidence of crimes against Scheduled Castes 




State/Union Territory  Number of cases per one lakh SC 
population 
1 Sikkim  87.19 
2   Gujarat  50.97 
3 Madhya  Pradesh  47.48 
4 Rajasthan  28.97 
5 Kerala  24.35 
6 Chandigarh  18.87 
7 Uttar  Pradesh  16.71 
All India  13.27 
8 Goa  12.31 
9 Karnataka  9.77 
10 Maharashtra  8.58 
11 Orissa  7.47 
12 Bihar  7.37 
13 Andhra  Pradesh  6.84 
14 Tamil  Nadu  6.32 
15   Himachal Pradesh  2.98 
16 Haryana  2.65 
17 Pondicherry  0.76 
18 Punjab  0.31 
19 Delhi  0.11 
20 West  Bengal  0.09 
 
Source: Official Website of the Ministry of Human Resource Development, Government of India at 




Part VI—Table 9: Ranking of states in terms of incidence of crimes and violence against 




State/Union Territory  Number of cases per one lakh ST 
population 
1 Kerala  48.91 
2   Sikkim  22.00 
3 Madhya  Pradesh  12.71 
4 Rajasthan  11.62 
                           All India  5.47 
5 Gujarat  4.93 
6  Dadra & Nagar Haveli   4.57 
7 Maharashtra  4.52 
8 Andhra  Pradesh  2.93 
9 Orissa  1.83 
10 Karnataka  1.41 
11 West  Bengal  0.37 
12 Manipur  0.16 
13 Bihar  0.08 
 
Source: Official Website of the Ministry of Human Resource Development, Government of India at 




Part VI—Table 10: Statement showing offence-wise distribution of cases of atrocities on the 
Scheduled Castes during 1992 
 
Nature of crime and number of cases reported  State/Union  
Territory  Murder Grievous
Hurt





39 225 49 8 403  724
Bihar 36  49 48 44 749  926
G o a  1   --- -   1
Gujarat 29  72 10 17 1432  1560
Haryana 5  5 24 - 52  86
Himachal Pradesh  1  7 5 - 26  39
Jammu and Kashmir  -  3 2 4 16  25
Karnataka 21  25 17 26 631  720
Kerala 10  19 39 21 614  703
Madhya Pradesh  97  236 287 70 3881  4571
Maharashtra 15  35 36 22 643  751
Orissa 11  16 17 25 314  383
Punjab 7  5 4 - 2  18
Rajasthan 63  148 114 79 1800  2204
Sikkim -  - - - 21  21
Tamil Nadu  12  9 2 14 640  677
Uttar Pradesh  343  762 174 289 3323  4891
West Bengal  1  1 3 - 10  15
Chandigarh 1  2 4 - 13  20
Delhi 1  - - - 1  2
Pondicherry -  - - - 1  1
Total 693  1619 835 619 14574  18340
 




    
 
Part VI—Table 11: Summary of Digest of Newspaper-reported Atrocities against Dalits 
July-December 2002 
 
Atrocity Date  Place  No.  Dalits  affected Information  on  Incident 
8 August  Arora, Bhojpur 
dist, Bihar 
3 dalits from 1 family shot 
dead 
Unknown killers 
12 August  Meerut  one  Higher caste suspected of murder - Dalits block 
highway with body in protest 
22 August  Balsingh Khera, 
Nagram, UP 
3 fishermen killed incl. a 12 
yr-old boy 
Killed with sharp-edged weapons 
27 August  Heend, 
Muzaffarnagar, UP
a 19 year-old Dalit gang-
raped and killed 
Woman gang-raped and hacked to death while 
collecting animal fodder 
3 September  Ramnagar in Satna 
district, Bhopal 
a dalit youth found hanging  Government doctor refused to conduct post-
mortem for 2 days 
5 October  Bhawaniapur 
Banghusari, 
Bahraich 
a Dalit lynched  Villagers killed the leather-worker for poisoning 
a buffalo 
15 October  Jhajjar dist, 
Haryana 
5 Dalit men lynched  Police mistakenly arrested the leather-workers 
for killing a cow. The cow was already dead, but 
the news spread from the police to surrounding 
villages, the youths were pulled out of the police 
station and beaten to death outside the police 
post. Two were torched. 
19 October  Dongra village, 
Narnaul, Haryana 
a six-year old girl raped and 
killed 
She was abducted while sleeping with her 
grandmother by unidentified persons, raped and 
died before being taken to hospital 
5 November  Burgijoi, 
Jehanabad 
2 women killed, 2 more 
missing from same family 
Bodies of two Dalit women from among four 
abducted on November 1 were found packed in 
gunny sacks in a pond. 
15 November Aatgaon, UP  3 beaten (young couple and a 
friend) and burnt alive 
After an upper caste young woman eloped with 
a young Dalit man, the two of them and the 
man's friend who helped them marry were 
beaten then burnt alive by the bride's family. 
Their charred remains were recovered from a 
nearby pond. 
1 December  Bhilai, Raipur  a 17 year-old Dalit lynched  The boy was lynched because of his affair with 
a Muslim girl - his body was found hanging in 
an externally locked cattle shed. 
Lynching / 
Murder 
21 December Doddathagalli, 
Bangalore 
Dalit farmer burnt alive  Returning home after selling potatoes, the 
assailants poured kerosene on the Dalit and set 
him on fire, robbing him of 30 Rupees. 
15 July  Hazaribagh, 
Jharkhand 
2 dalit women  Gang-raped, stripped naked, paraded, faces 
smeared with lime and cow dung 
23 August  Behta Bujurg, 
Kanpur 
a 14 year-old dalit girl  Gang-raped by four persons - police refused to 
register case 
27 August  Heend, 
Muzaffarnagar, UP
a 19 year-old Dalit gang-
raped and killed 
Woman gang-raped and hacked to death while 
collecting animal fodder 
12 September Aujula village, 
Kapurthala 
a Dalit girl raped repeatedly  Editor of a monthly journal repeatedly raped the 
girl after convincing her to go to his house in 
order to secure a govt job for her parents 
19 October  Dongra village, 
Narnaul, Haryana 
a six-year old girl raped and 
killed 
She was abducted while sleeping with her 
grandmother by unidentified persons, raped and 
died before being taken to hospital 
Rape 
31 October  Chaia, Ghatampur, 
UP 
a Dalit midwife gang-raped  She was brought by a man to assist in his wife's 
delivery, and was gang-raped by the man and 
two associates in the fields on the way to the 
birth    
 
7 November  Shna, Gugaon  Attempted rape at knife-point 
of Dalit girl 
An attempted rape of a Dalit girl at knife-point 
was prevented by a passerby. The girl's mother 
was attacked with the knife herself when she 
confronted the young man who attempted the 
rape. 
10 November Ara, Bihar  Wife of Dalit labourer raped 
by upper caste landlord 
The landlord mistakenly claimed that the 
labourer had not repaid a loan, and as 
punishment he raped the man's wife. 
 
10 December Mirwapur, Basti  10 year-old Dalit girl raped  The girl was raped while returning home from 
school 
7 July  Brahmagiri, Puri 
dist, Orissa 
3 dalits admitted to hospital, 
more injured 
Dalits victims arrested, upper caste perpetrators 
free 
24 August  Vijay Nagar, 
Ghaziabad 
3 Dalits from one family  6 trade tax officials investigated for abusive 
caste language, beating, and stealing family's 
property 
14 September Kayundanpatti, 
Dindigul dist, TN 
a Dalit farm labourer  Beaten, insulted, forced to drink urine after 
contesting a land dispute with caste Hindu 
21 September Chakwara, 
Rajasthan 
All Dalits of the village, 
numbering hundreds 
Dalits tried to access village pond and temple - 
path blocked by police and 7,000 upper castes. 
Clash with police resulted in injuries to 15 
police and 17 Dalits 
20 September Kaimur dist, Bihar 3 Dalit labourers  Hospitalised with serious injuries after being 
beaten by upper castes for sheltering from rain 
in a temple 
29 October  Sivaganga dist  1 Dalit man  Beaten with wooden logs by caste Hindus for 
objecting to the use of machinery instead of 
village labour for a de-silting project 
12 November Bhagwatipur, 
Rohtak 
6 Dalit male youths beaten 
and one woman beaten. 
Another Dalit woman's 
clothes torn 
For three hours, the youths were beaten with 
sharp sticks by upper caste youths because they 
disliked the manner in which one of the Dalit 
youths wore his shirt. They were admitted to 
hospital. A woman was also beaten while trying 
to help a Dalit woman whose clothes were torn 
by the attackers. 
15 December Nawada Aar, 
Haryana 
5 Dalits injured  Attacked by persons hired by upper caste, the 
second time the families had been attacked 
within a month. 
22 December Hindu College, 
Delhi University 
3 Dalit students suffered leg, 
face, back and finger 
fractures and bruises 
Students locked in a room and beaten for hours 
by 15 persons over 'caste issues' 
30 December Villupuram dist  Attack on 350 Dalits 
attending a cultural event 
Caste Hindu armed gang assaulted the crowd 






31 December Karnepally 
mandal, 
Khammam 
Dalit woman, a meal 
volunteer, beaten by upper 
castes 
Two upper caste persons objected to a Dalit 
helping to prepare food, and threatened and 
attacked her. 
15 July  Hazaribagh, 
Jharkhand 
2 Dalit women  Gang-raped, stripped naked, paraded, faces 
smeared with lime and cow dung 
21 September Pratapgarh dist, 
UP 
1 Dalit woman  Police and tehsil employees allegedly paraded 
the woman naked before locking her up for the 
night 
28 September Burmamines 
Harijan bustee, 
Jamshedpur 
1 Dalit woman  She was beaten up, her hair forcibly cut and 
paraded half naked with a garland of shoes 
around her neck by her husband and others after 




30 September Sultanwind, 
Punjab 
1 Dalit woman  After a petty dispute with a man, he and his 
supported tore off her clothes in public and beat 
her    
 
29 October  Sivaganga dist  1 Dalit man  Beaten and paraded half-naked by caste Hindus 
for objecting to the use of machinery instead of 
village labour for a de-silting project 
17 November Dharmganj, 
Kishanganj 
1 woman assaulted and 
paraded half-naked 
The Dalit woman testified that 8 persons 
forcibly entered her home, abused and assaulted 
her and paraded her in public wearing only her 
petticoat over a long-running land dispute. 
 
20 December Vishnupur, 
Golpalganj dist, 
Bihar 
Dalit paraded naked and face 
blackened with paint 
He was humiliated because he went to fetch his 




24 August  Vijay Nagar, 
Ghaziabad 
3 Dalits from one family  6 trade tax officials investigated for abusive 
caste language, beating, and stealing family's 
property  
28 July  Chennai, Tamil 
Nadu 
Numerous  2/3-tumbler system - 1 shop-owner arrested  Untouchability 
practices 
10 September Arra dist, Patna  Numerous  100 Ranvir Sena (upper caste private army) 
prisoners refuse to share kitchen with Dalit 
prisoners 
2 August  Thinniyam, 
Tiruchi dist 
2 Dalit men  Forced to 'feed each other' faeces after 
complaining of upper caste swindle 
14 September Kayundanpatti, 
Dindigul dist, TN 
a Dalit farm labourer  Beaten, insulted, forced to drink urine after 




26 December Kolar, Karnataka  Dalit youth beaten and forced 
to drink urine 
After brutally assaulting the Dalit auto driver, 
and hearing the Dalits pleas for water, the 
assailant instead forced him to drink urine. 
2 August  Thinniyam, 
Tiruchi dist 
25 men and their families  Denied farm work after giving information for 
arrest of 9 people from upper caste  
20 August  Mittamanupalle, 
Mydukur mandal, 
AP 
120 families  10 villages deny work after charges pressed for 
burning hutments 
2 September  Moondkheri, 
Patiala 
15 escaped bonded labourers 
and families 
banned from buying even milk and sugar 
21 September Chakwara, 
Rajasthan 
All Dalits of the village, 
numbering hundreds 
subjected to socio-economic boycott for 
attempting to access village pond and temple 
20 December Vaghrota, Prantij 
taluka, 
Ahmedabad 
Socio-economic boycott of 
local Dalits - numerous 
families 
Boycott, including preventing purchase of 
essential commodities, was implemented 
because the Dalits refused to give their 
traditional burial ground to the upper castes. 
Social / Economic 
Boycott 
30 December Villupuram dist  About 350 Dalits  Social boycott implemented after Dalits pressed 
charges for a violent attack on them by caste 
Hindus. Boycott prevented the Dalits' cattle 
from grazing in the village, as well as 
preventing the purchase of items in shops. 
13 August  Hassan Bhatti, 
Faridkot 
6 - one family  Beaten after injury prevented him doing bonded 
labour, family denied food 
20 August  Mojo Khurd, 
Mansa 
one bonded labourer  Escaped after landlord beat him with a spade 
Debt 
Bondage 
2 September  Moondkheri, 
Patiala 
15 bonded labourers and 
families 
Subjected to economic boycott after escape 
4 September  Mehru, Jalandhar  50 Dalit families  Driven out of public homes by panchayat for 
voting for opposition 
Denial of food / 
water / housing 
21 September Chakwara, 
Rajasthan 
All Dalits of the village, 
numbering hundreds 




    
 
  17 October  Baran, Rajasthan  At least 12, most children of 
babies die of starvation / 
malnutrition 
Panchayat corruption diverted emergency food 
away from lowest caste, who were then forced 
to eat grass and other inedible plants, resulting 
in starvation, malnutrition and digestive 
sickness 
12 July  Bhagalpur, Banka 
dist. 
Six families  Six Dalit houses burnt by 20 armed upper caste 
persons 
16 July  Raigopalpur, 
Kanpur 
2 - Dalit woman and 
daughter 
House and property burnt by woman's 
'opponent's 
Destruction of 
houses / property 
23 July  Mittamanupalle, 
Mydukur mandal, 
AP 
Numerous families  Hutments burnt by upper caste persons 
Land-
grabbing 
7 July  Brahmagiri, Puri 
dist, Orissa 
Whole village of prawn-
farmers 
Resentment of dalit economic success 
16 July  Kodagu dist, 
Bangalore 
2 - young cricketer (admitted 
to hospital; assaulted on 
genitalia) and his brother 
Sub-Insp. Police suspended for torture  Torture 
7 July  Ulagampatti, 
Sivaganga 
a 27 year old Dalit woman  She was beaten inside the house by 4 
plainclothes police, dragged outside and beaten 
with a log till she lost consciousness. She awoke 
in Ulagampatti police station. Sustained 
multiple thigh and back injuries. 
 
 
Some Totals:  
  63 Atrocities  
  23 murders  
  9 rapes including at least 3 Dalit minors, one attempted rape  
  26 Dalits assaulted, plus large sections of 2 Dalit villages  
  8 Dalits paraded naked or semi-naked  
  4 Dalits forced to consume urine or faeces  
  6 cases of socio-economic boycott, affecting over a thousand Dalits  
  Hundreds of Dalits excluded from food, water or housing  
  3 Dalits tortured by the police  
  1368 individuals plus 8 whole villages immediately affected  
 
Source:   Digest of Atrocities/Violence/Killings against Dalits, India Committee of the 
Netherlands—April 2, 2003. 
http:/www.india.net.nl/atroc1.htm
    
 
 




Part VII—Table 1:  Showing representation of social formations of castes and communities 
in different middle class locations: 1996 National Survey 
 
Social Formation 












































































































1.  The survey, based on a stratified random sample (probability proportionate to size) of 9457 Indian citizens drawn 
from all the Indian states, excluding the state of Jammu and Kashmir, was conducted by the Centre for the Study 
of Developing Societies, Delhi, in June-July 1996. 
 
2.  The sample population classfied into five social transformations: 
1.  Upper castes: This social formation comprises castes with high ritual status (dwija) in the varna 
hierarchy as well as some upwardly mobile dominant castes of rich farmers, traditionally identified with a 
low varna status i.e., Sudra. The castes included in this category are not entitled to benefits of affirmation 
action (24.8 per cent in the sample). 
2.  Backward castes: These include Hindu castes of lower peasantry and of artisans traditionally 
identified with the lowest varna category of Sudras as well as the lower peasant and artisan communities 
belonging to other non-Hindu religious groups (non-Hindus also have caste-like formations). Castes and 
communities comprising this category are entitled to the benefits of affirmative action (39.3 per cent in the 
sample). 
3.  Dalits: These include castes and communities of ex-untouchables belonging to different religious groups, 
receiving benefits of affirmative action (19.7 per cent in the sample). 
4.  Tribals: These tribal communities belonging to different, religious faiths, tribal and the mainstream, but 
entitled to affirmative action benefits (9.7 per cent in the sample).    
 
5.  Muslims: This category excludes those Muslim communities that are classified as backward and as such 
are included among backward castes. This category only includes the upper strata of Muslims not entitled to 
affirmative action benefits (6.5 per cent in the sample). 
 
3.  The table shows distribution of the above five social formations in different middle class 
positions. Five separate indicators are used for identifying middle class positions: (a) 
education: those with education above the high-school level; (b) ownership of assets: those 
owning three or more assets among the following: (i) a car/jeep/tractor, (ii) a 
scooter/motorbike, (iii) water-pumping set, (iv) house/flat, (v) television; (5) self-
identification as members of the ‘middle class’: i.e., respondents who reject working class 




Part VII—Table 2: Caste and Occupation 
 
Castes/Communities   














1    3.8    0.6    3.5    0.7    0.5    0.8    0.3    0.5    3.8 
White collar employees
2  34.7  21.3  21.2  14.4    7.5    9.0  10.0    7.2  14.6 
Large business    3.6    2.0  10.1    2.0    0.9    1.6    0.2    1.6    2.8 
Petty business
3  13.4    7.0  25.8    6.3    5.8  10.0    5.3  12.5  14.6 
Artisan/Blue collar 
workers/Service providers 
 9.0    8.7    9.5  13.6  14.6  34.1  25.5  23.7  20.5 
 
Source:  National Election Study, 1999, Centre for the Study of Developing Societies, Delhi. 
 
  The Survey canvassed a total of 9418 respondents drawn by stratified ramdom sample, 
probability proportionate to size (PPS). 
 
Notes:   1.   High professionals include medical doctors, engineers, lawyers, chartered 
accountants, university and college teachers. 
 
  2.   White–collar employees include government and non–government officers, teachers, 
clerks, and managers. 
 
3.   Petty business includes small shop–owners, hawkers, salespersons, shop assistants, 








Part VIII—Table 1: Quota System—1948 
 
Quota Population  %  Region / Province 
%  
East Bengal  42  56.75 
(West) Punjab  24  28.00 
Karachi   2    1.50 
All other provinces and princely states of West Pakistan  17  13.75 
Potential migrants from India  15   (9.80) 









Part VIII—Table 2: Quota System—1949 
 
Category Quota  % 
Merit 20 
East Bengal  40 
Punjab (including Bahawalpur)  23 
Karachi   2 
All other provinces and princely states  15 
 




Part VIII—Table 3: Quota: The 1973 Constitution 
 




Sindh  19 (Rural 11.4, Urban 7.6) 
NWFP 11.5 
Baluchistan    3.5 
Northern Areas and FATA  4 







Part VIII—Table 4: Pakistan: Ethnic Representation in Federal Bureaucracy, 1973 – 86 
 
Ethnic Group  1973  1983  1986 
 All  Senior All  Senior  All  Senior 
Punjabi  49.3 53.5 54.9  55.8  55.3  57.7 
Pathan  10.5   7.0 13.4  11.6  12.6  12.1 
Sindhi  3.1  2.7   5.4    5.1  7.2    6.7 
Mohajir  30.1 33.5 17.4  20.2  18.2  18.3 
NA   2.6   1.3   3.6    3.4    1.4    1.5 
AJK   1.8   0.5   1.9    0.9    1.7    0.7 
Total  100.0 100.0 100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
 
Source:  Charles H. Kennedy, ‘Managing Ethnic Conflict: The Case of Pakistan’, Regional 
Politics and Policy, Spring 1993, No. 1, p 138. 
 




Part VIII—Table 5: Regional Representation in Officer Grades: 1993 
 




Punjab 62.36  50.0 
Sindh (Urban)    9.51    7.5 
Sindh (Rural)    7.63  11.4 
NWFP 12.41  11.5 
Baluchistan    3.01    3.5 
NA/FATA   3.69    4.0 
AJK   1.29    2.0 
 
Source:  Establishment Division, Federal Secretariat, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad, Civil 






Part VIII—Table 6: Representation in Autonomous Bodies/Public Corporations: 1993 
 
Province  Number Percentage Prescribed  Quota 
Punjab 25,772  49.94  50.0 
Sindh (Urban)  13,815  26.77    7.6 
Sindh (Rural)  4,213  8.16  11.4 
NWFP 5,249  10.17  11.5 
Baluchistan 1,255  2.43     3.5 
NA –  –  – 
FATA  638  1.24    4.0 
AJK  664  1.29    2.0 
 
Source:  Establishment Division, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad, Statement showing 
Number of Employees, Province and Grade–wise, in BPS 17 and above working in the 
Autonomous/Semi–Autonomous Bodies/Corporations of the Federal Government, 1 
January 1993. 
 
The tables are reproduced from Ethnic Studies Report, Vol. XV, No. 2, July 1997. 
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